

Progressive Planning

The Magazine of Planners Network

Security and Planning



Donovan Finn

Surveillance camera, New York City.

Also In This Issue:

Marcuse on U.S. Social Forum

The Seventh Generation

"In our every deliberation, we must consider the impact of our decisions on the next seven generations."

-From the Great Law of the Iroquois Confederacy

Security and Planning After 9-11*

by AMY SICILIANO AND NORMA RANTISI

Since the 1990s the increase in terrorist-related attacks, particularly in cities, has led to the erection of both physical and social boundaries in many places. Material and symbolic fortification strategies rejuvenate a postwar anxiety around everyday life. But one key difference with the earlier anxieties associated with the Cold War, which promoted massive urban flight, is that security initiatives today are bound up with urban regeneration and competitive city strategies. Contemporary measures go beyond the prevention of terrorist activities and seek to create "secure spaces" by reproducing the existing social order. In this enterprise legitimate forms of democratic protest are labelled as "security concerns." Poverty, difference, and immigrants are criminalized and considered "out of place" in the landscape of late capitalist development.

This issue of *Progressive Planning* examines the intersection of security and planning from a variety of perspectives. But rather than simply focus on whether or not security initiatives are effective planning tools the articles pivot on the question of why we have such security initiatives at all. This is an important distinction in an age where terrorism is perceived as a permanent condition that must be planned for and managed, not a problem that has emerged out of particular social conditions and historical relations. Indeed, terrorism is seen as a part of "everyday life" and just another "risk" to be planned for. Thus, technocratic solutions, often uncritically imported and adapted from defense planning at national levels, are promoted as the way to manage these risks, while more fundamental and structural issues of inequality and uneven development remain unchallenged.

Capitalist strategies of accumulation provide the social and economic context for security initiatives. Several contributions in this special issue address the role that planning plays in how space is restructured, governed and 'secured'. Dorries, for example shows how a Six Nations protest over contested land on a residential subdivision in southern Ontario has been characterized as a security concern rather than a legitimate policy and planning issue by both the state as well as mainstream media. In attempts to provide credibility to this framing, the protesters in some instances are labelled as 'terrorists', to situate this event within dominant discourses of security in a post 9/11 world.

This issue provides a window into the growing interconnection between security and planning – in discourse and in practice – in a post 9/11 context. While this unholy alliance may not be entirely new, today it is assuming a more complex and insidious form. And as the prospects for alternative practices become more daunting, we feel that critical analyses and engagement – like those offered in the articles of this issue - are all the more significant.

* Thanks to Carla Klassen (Concordia University, Montreal, Canada) for her help with the editing process.

Amy Siciliano is a PhD Candidate in the Department of Geography, Programme in Planning, University of Toronto, Toronto, Ontario. Norma Rantisi is associate professor in the Department of Geography, Planning and Environment, Concordia University, Montreal, Quebec, Canada and co-chair of the Planners Network Steering Committee.

Fall 2007 Issue Contents:

Security and Planning

2. **Security and Planning After 9-11***
by Amy Siciliano and Norma Rantisi
4. **Networked Security in the City: A Call to Action for Planners**
by Matt Hidek
10. **Civic Duty: From Neighborhood Watch to 'USAOnWatch'**
by Marilena Liguori
13. **Israel's Wall in Palestine: Control, not Security**
by Gary Fields
17. **From Fences to Walls on the U.S.-Mexico Boundary**
by Joseph Nevins
20. **Planning Biodefense: Security and the Competitive City**
by Paul Jackson
24. **Sexuality, Security and Imprisonment: The Closure of the Gay and Transgender Unit at Rikers Island**
by Justin Steil, Cynthia Golembeski, Carmelo Larose and Vanessa Agard-Jones

27. **"Critical Incidents" or Business as Usual? Planning and Aboriginal Protest in Ontario**
by Heather Dorries

Feature Articles

30. **The U.S. Social Forum: Major Success for Networking**
by Peter Marcuse
31. **Hurricane Katrina and Environmental Justice**
by David E. Johnson
33. **Constitutional Reforms in Venezuela Foretell a Planning Revolution**
by Clara Irazábal
34. **Challenging Coke's Thirst for Water: The Apizaco Story**
by Marie Kennedy and Chris Tilly

Departments

38. **PN Resources**
43. **How to Join, Purchase Back Issues, etc.**

www.plannersnetwork.org

Planners Network
106 West Sibley Hall
Cornell University
Ithaca, NY 14853, USA
Ph: 607.254.8890
Fx: 612.626.0600
Email: sbs17@cornell.edu

WEBSITE
www.plannersnetwork.org

EDITORS
Tom Angotti and Ann Forsyth

EDITORIAL BOARD
Eve Baron, Jason Blackman, Kara Heffeman, Chester Hartman, Clara Irazábal, Marie Kennedy, Norma Rantisi, Amy Siciliano

CONTRIBUTING EDITORS
Guillaume Neault, Katherine Rankin, Norma Rantisi, Alejandro Rofman

LAYOUT
Donovan Finn

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Networked Security in the City: A Call to Action for Planners

by MATT HIDEK

Since the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the United States government has developed defensive strategies to protect its cities through a complex web of networked security initiatives. As part of the “Global War on Terror,” the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has partnered with state and local law enforcement agencies to deploy military-based intelligence systems in cities such as New York, Los Angeles and Washington, D.C. The continued integration of federal security policies within urban institutions is changing the way cities are governed.

Military doctrine, tactics and technologies continue to shape our cities. Planners play a vital role in the stewardship of cities, and increasingly in the realm of community preparedness. As such, it is imperative that we better understand how anti-terrorism planning is impacting urban planning and policymaking, and foster a discussion of a more inclusive and citizen-oriented form of security for cities.

Legacy of Antiterrorism Systems

On August 15, 2007 we learned that the director of national intelligence and the DHS authorized the expansion of

geospatial intelligence systems within U.S. territory. Geospatial intelligence, or “GEOINT,” merges airborne and satellite imagery, maps, charts and environmental information to provide an electronic picture of the Earth’s terrain. While the program’s expansion may have been “news” to the public and met with surprise by some alarmed citizens, this activity had actually been going on for awhile. The program also mirrors a number of governmental networking initiatives enacted since 9/11 that are linked to the military. As Charles Allen, assistant secretary for the DHS Office of Intelligence and Analysis, explained on National Public Radio, “This is not going to be anything unusual. It’s going to be simply an expansion of current activities and a more formalized way of doing some of the things that have been done ad-hoc.”

Ad-hoc is indeed the right word to describe this phenomenon, as today’s urban security systems have evolved from longstanding federal antiterrorism programs, especially since the end of the Cold War. When policy attention was directed to counterterrorism following the 1993 World Trade Center and 1995 Oklahoma City bombings, the military

and the Department of Defense (DOD) became the tip of the U.S. government’s bayonet. Efforts intensified following the 1998 attacks on the U.S embassies in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, and Nairobi, Kenya. Military operations in the Persian Gulf and the Balkans and hundreds of overseas forward-operating installations thus became the testbed for antiterrorism methods and technologies. The 2000 attack on the U.S.S. Cole in Yemen again renewed the protective stance of the U.S. military, while alarm bells sounded within the national intelligence apparatus based in Washington. Then came 9/11.

The attacks on New York’s World Trade Center in Lower Manhattan and the Pentagon in Northern Virginia created an urgent need for the U.S. to demonstrate that it had the capacity to protect its domestic territory, particularly its urban areas. The question for the Bush administration was how best to do this, and where expertise would come from. Institutional inertia took over as two policy thrusts collided. One focused on the response-oriented mission of disaster preparedness; the other on the preventive posture of protection. For those developing strategy on the inside, or what the

Security and Planning



Army calls “behind the fence,” military slang for classified operations, the methods and tactics were already in place.

Military Strategy Dominates

“Force protection,” the military’s approach to protecting its bases and garrisons throughout the world, and “homeland defense,” a long-standing program for the overall protection of the U.S. mainland against terrorism, became the broad, strategic approach. Both programs were operating prior to 9/11. Additionally, military intelligence, a decision-making specialization that steers the collection, analysis, safeguarding and flow of information, was used to weave a web among the many institutions involved in protecting the homeland. Meanwhile, civilian-based emergency management systems in place long before 9/11 continued to guide everyday planning activity at the state and local levels.

Disaster expert and sociologist Kathleen Tierney describes this relationship as the top-down “command and control” model winning out over the “horizontal community preparedness” model in a conflict that has been repeated throughout the history of U.S. civil defense. In short, DOD’s “domestic preparedness program,” in place since the late 1990s, would lead to the enhancement of the homeland security apparatus. At the same time, the U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM) was created, leading to more top-down “command authority” within U.S.

territory. Finally, the Homeland Security Act of 2002 officially established DHS through the merging of twenty-two separate federal agencies and mandated a comprehensive strategy to secure the nation’s critical infrastructure.

As a former Army officer and DHS antiterrorism analyst who has worked closely with these systems, I see the threat of terrorism as real and the deployment of defensive systems as necessary. The problem is *how* these systems are used and to what societal benefit. Within antiterrorism planning circles, the assessment of urban “risk” and “vulnerability” is deemed of utmost importance for urban security. At the heart of this process is the systematic evaluation of infrastructure by federal planners working in the bowels of the security apparatus in Washington, D.C.

With some innovative exceptions, the planning focus of the federal security planners is almost exclusively on conducting *vulnerability assessments*, which leads to the development of rank-order listings of “critical” facilities. The resulting “criticality” ratings that drive federal funding for our cities generally involves limited examination of infrastructure, often without field-based inspection and devoid of an integrated methodology that accounts for both the built and human/social environments. The alarming evidence presented by Hurricane Katrina’s impact on New Orleans, for example, renders this “criticality” approach questionable at best.

Standing Guard over the City

In an attempt to thwart would-be terrorists, highly classified security networks using electronic mapping, airborne imagery, cutting-edge communication technologies, human forms of intelligence and electronic monitoring are now deployed in U.S. cities. These networks operate twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week. Other more visible examples of fortification and surveillance in urban space include the retrofitting of bridges, tunnels, highways and transit lines; the construction of bollards, barriers and fences to protect buildings; and the extensive use of undercover policing.

In cities such as New York, Los Angeles and Chicago, homeland security initiatives focus on infrastructure that connects to, or is geographically located in, central business districts. Government facilities, especially in the Washington capital area, as well as regional hubs such as Denver, Philadelphia and Atlanta, are given top priority. Jon Coafee brought attention to this issue in his 2003 book, *Terrorism, Risk and the City*, which examines the “ring of steel,” a term that describes the security and surveillance systems in use within the zone surrounding the financial district in London, commonly known as “the City.” In 2004, a special collection, *Cities, War, and Terrorism*, edited by the British geographer Stephen Graham, examined the intersection of homeland security, cities and geopolitics. Very little practical analysis, however, has been

put forth to determine how city planning has been integrated with existing institutional approaches to urban security. Investigating this question and documenting evidence of the military-security nexus embedded within federal plans and operations can reveal ways in which planning, policy and governance have been synthesized through homeland security programs.

London's game plan has been picked up by New York, put into action through its Lower Manhattan Security Initiative (LMSI). With particular emphasis around Wall Street, the LMSI plans to add over 3,000 security cameras to the permanent and semi-permanent checkpoints manned by police and National Guard soldiers. Antiterrorism measures employed in these areas include the narrowing of roads entering the city and the use of tight sequences of S-shaped curves, which require drivers to slow down, thereby enabling high-resolution, closed-circuit cameras to capture their license plates and faces. Entry points into business districts, pedestrian zones and subway stations now also have concrete medians with checkpoints and armed guards.

The overarching strategy behind these initiatives can be found in planning and policy documents such as the National Strategy for Homeland Security, The National Strategy for the Protection of Critical Infrastructures and Key Assets, the Urban Areas Security Initiative (UASI), the National Incident Management System (NIMS), the National

Intelligence Strategy and the National Infrastructure Protection Plan. These documents provide a snapshot of how military-oriented intelligence systems work in U.S. cities, employing state-of-the-art secure "fusion centers" with cutting-edge computer and communications equipment. These hubs are veritable copycats of the military's "tactical operations

Anti-terrorism measures include the narrowing of roads and tight S-shaped curves, enabling cameras to capture license plates and faces.

centers," which can be thought of as coordinating units that integrate a "full spectrum" of operations. A clear example of this approach is the National Counterterrorism Center, a secure facility in Northern Virginia that "fuses" intelligence through its "networked security approach."

We can see this web in action within the institutional landscape of urban security. For example, in August of 2005, the New York Metropolitan Transportation Authority (MTA) awarded a \$212 million contract to Lockheed, one of the nation's largest defense firms. At the time, this was the largest antiterrorism program awarded since 9/11. This has been coupled with the retooling of the New York Police Department's longstanding CompStat program for antiterrorism purposes, recently promoted by the Department of Justice as a national model. Likewise, in Los Angeles, Police Chief William Bratton, a former New York City police commissioner and one

of the driving forces behind the implementation of CompStat, has initiated an almost identical strategy through "Operation Archangel."

The integration of these national intelligence systems with local law enforcement depends on the literal replication of what the military refers to as "tactics, techniques

and procedures." For example, the National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP) promotes DHS' Infrastructure and Critical Asset Viewer, or "iCAV," as a tool to leverage existing geospatial capabilities and technology used by the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA). NGA is a member of the U.S Intelligence Community, a federation of executive branch entities that conduct intelligence activities, and many refer to it as a "spy agency." The iCAV replicates NGA's "Palenterra" mapping tool.


As the NIPP clearly states, the iCAV serves as a key link between the military, DHS and U.S. cities for the mapping, analysis and sorting of critical infrastructure and other key resources through a growing "National Threat Incident Database." The emergence of this planning tool involves extensive military-civil integration and the bending of federal statutes. By law, NGA's original authorization prevents data sharing with state and local government agencies. ⇨

To circumvent this problem, the National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA) and the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) created a memorandum of understanding to establish data sharing agreements with state and local governments. For example, the 133

and weeks after 9/11. Through the use of these newly established policy mechanisms, federal and municipal governments and their corporate partners have established a highly coordinated means of connecting the organizations and institutions

of government to actually provide security.

Furthermore, along with direct collaboration between the Army, DHS and urban police departments throughout the country, the development of these systems also includes the extensive involvement of military contracting giants such as Northrup Grumman, Lockheed Martin, SAIC, Titan, Booz Allen and Raytheon, just to name a few. Compounding this problem, most infrastructure protection projects are designed and carried out by federal contractors who have limited knowledge of urban planning and governance. Although federal plans clearly describe effective implementation of homeland security programs as dependent on extensive stakeholder coordination, the actual involvement of local residents in the planning process itself has been extremely limited. Communities and their neighborhoods are typically left out of ongoing participation in the development of security and mitigation plans, possibly leading to a further intensification of existing disparities and socio-economic stress.



Cities Project, created by pre-9/11 federal legislation, was reworked to apply its geospatial intelligence mission via a partnership between DOD, DHS and the USGS known as Project Homeland. Bucking its usual role as a provider of combat support to traditional military applications outside of the continental U.S., the creation of NORTHCOM has enabled NGA, thus the U.S. state, to extend its unique, powerful and potentially dangerous capabilities to the defense of cities.

A key player for Project Homeland is NGA's new "Office of the Americas," activated in the days

involved with antiterrorism at all levels of governance.

We should be concerned about the application of these methods within the urban environment—a complex and adaptive system that cannot be approached and defended in the same way as an Army garrison. Serious questions also remain about whether the conflation of *intelligence planning* (terrorism-focused defensive security merged with urban police agencies) and *disaster planning* (all hazards-oriented command and control systems merged with local emergency management agencies) has improved the ability

America can remain safe. Meanwhile, the public's right-to-know federal homeland security policies are constrained by the federal government's recurring claim that key information is "government sensitive" due to national security concerns.

While claiming to "secure" everyday life in the city, urban security systems clearly intrude upon the would-be privacy of people. We must ask ourselves how effective these systems can be, and if they are worth both the financial and societal expense. If integrated intelligence systems in Iraq cannot stop the destructive effect of an Improvised Explosive Device (IED), how can we expect them to work at home?

The reality is that the primary threat to U.S. national security may extend well beyond the threat of terrorism. This possibility is evidenced in the destruction of New Orleans, the threat posed by the avian flu virus, the human and geopolitical crises in Afghanistan and Iraq and the ongoing but seemingly hidden decline of our cities. As Jennifer Light points out in her seminal book *From Warfare to Welfare*, despite the fact that professionals experienced in both military operations and urban analysis have publicly stated that managing cities is more challenging, framing the urban crisis as a national security crisis is a hard argument to sell. Moreover, as Susan Clarke and Erika Chenoweth point out in their excellent 2006 article, *The Politics of Vulnerability: Constructing Local Performance Regimes for Homeland*

Security, the National League of Cities found that homeland security was a low-ranking priority for urban policy.

Federal guidance to mitigate potential threats from terrorism (as well as natural or technological disasters) is almost exclusively limited to the built environment. Very few professionals working within the realm of defense and security have been academically and professionally trained in urban studies. As a result, our understanding of the impact of military systems and antiterrorism policies in cities has been hampered, resulting in a gap for both practitioners and scholars. Thus, urban security plans tend to focus almost exclusively on the tenets of physical protection and general emergency preparedness rather than the broader notion of *societal security*, a term associated with a cooperative, participatory approach to communities and their citizens.

By adopting the rational-deductive order of military doctrine, today's urban security strategies appear to be disconnected from urban disaster preparedness systems designed to protect and respond to community crises. This stands at odds with the human-centric concerns that drive our collective activities, whether as city planners, policymakers, academics, community workers, disaster planners, activists or citizens. As planners, we are able to understand how the geographical and institutional impacts of the post-9/11 "terrain of security" are changing the city. Antiterrorism

pioneer John Sullivan, a lieutenant with the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department, has noted how "geosocial intelligence" can provide a means for security planners to account for the full range of social systems at work in our urban areas, including psychological factors that impact daily operations. These more inclusive analyses would enable today's terrorism-centric frameworks to be improved, with a focus on pre-incident community-based preparedness.

A Call to Action for Planners

Since 9/11, many planners now find themselves working within the expanding field of hazard mitigation and emergency management. As such, we must formally address the need for practitioners and teachers who have expertise in military operations and homeland security planning. Charting the terrain of urban security requires their insight, as we must improve our understanding of how the military sphere intersects with civilian institutions in our communities. This is controversial among progressive planners. Doing so, however, will enable new means of critically investigating the emerging gap between community development and urban security and provide valuable insight into more inclusive and progressive initiatives in the future.

More broadly, planners must work collectively with decision-makers to determine how governmental security is setting the agenda for local **(Continued on Page 16)**

Civic Duty: *From Neighborhood Watch to 'USAOnWatch'*

by MARILENA LIGUORI

On November 8, 2001 and in the wake of 9/11, President George W. Bush called on all Americans "to serve by bettering our communities and, thereby, defy and defeat the terrorists." During the State of the Union address on January 29, 2002, he once again asked all Americans to commit at least two years (or 4,000 hours) to the service of their neighbors and their nation. Following these speeches, a set of initiatives to enable Americans to do just that were announced.

One of the initiatives was USAOnWatch, established in 2002 as part of Citizen Corps, one of four new programs under the umbrella of USA Freedom Corps. The idea behind USA Freedom Corps is to increase opportunities for citizens to get involved in strengthening communities, thereby contributing to the security of the nation. Citizen Corps seeks to directly engage citizens in homeland security by

being prepared, getting training in first aid and emergency skills and supporting first responders.

USAOnWatch is an extension of the Neighborhood Watch program, which was set up in the 1970s to enlist citizens' involvement in crime prevention. USAOnWatch, however, has broadened the original responsibilities and mandate of local crime prevention to include terrorism detection and prevention. Since its inception, Neighborhood Watch was criticized for encouraging social divisiveness. An evaluation of USAOnWatch suggests that some key elements of this program also threaten to create social tensions within and between communities and to undermine urban life more generally.

From Neighborhood Watch to USAOnWatch

Since its creation over thirty years ago, the National Neighborhood

Watch program has become an integral component of community-based crime prevention efforts in American cities. A Neighborhood Watch group can be formed around any geographical unit: a block, apartment building, park, business area, public housing complex or office. The program works to prevent and reduce crime at the local level by fostering collaboration between communities and law enforcement agencies. The program relies on an approach known as "opportunity reduction," which seeks to decrease opportunities for would-be offenders to commit crime rather than attempting to change their behavior or motivation. Opportunity reduction is achieved by increasing the level of informal surveillance in residential areas and encouraging residents to watch out for and report suspicious incidents to the police.

Neighborhood Watch typically focuses on observation and

USAOnWatch is the Face of the National Neighborhood Watch Program



USAonwatch through Neighborhood Watch empowers citizens in our communities with the opportunity to volunteer to work toward the safety of our homeland.

USAonwatch.org Neighborhood Watch Program
NATIONAL SHERIFFS' ASSOCIATION

awareness as a means of preventing crime and employs strategies that range from promoting social interaction and “watching out for each other” to encouraging groups of citizens to actively patrol the neighborhood. Neighborhood Watch groups act as the “eyes and ears” of the police. The broader intended impact of the program, however, is that by bringing community members together to reestablish control of their neighborhoods, quality of life will increase and crime will fall. For law enforcement agencies, Neighborhood Watch is a cornerstone of local crime prevention intended to increase local solidarity and self-confidence in the face of crime.

The Neighborhood Watch Program was pioneered by the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) in the aftermath of civil unrest during the late 1960s. The program was originally meant to rebuild community support for the LAPD while at the same time developing a network of watchful neighbors. In 1972, the National Sheriffs’ Association (NSA), a non-profit, took the concept a step further by seeking funding to make the program a national initiative. The Law Enforcement Assistance Administration awarded a grant to the NSA and thus began the National Neighborhood Watch Program. Initially the program was devoted primarily to disseminating information on the nature and volume of burglary and making residential property less vulnerable to break-ins. From there it evolved into a program that promoted the establishment

of ongoing local Neighborhood Watch groups that encouraged citizens to partner with their law enforcement agencies in an effort to reduce various types of neighborhood crime. The program became extremely popular in the 1980s and the concept has been implemented in many cities, particularly in North America and the United Kingdom.

In 2002, the NSA was awarded a \$1.9 million grant by the Department of Justice (DOJ) to expand and enhance the National Neighborhood Watch Program with a view to doubling the number of Neighborhood Watch groups operating across the United States from 7,500 to 15,000 by 2004. In order to accomplish this goal, the NSA and DOJ, along with other federal agencies, launched USAOnWatch to encourage the initiation and/or revitalization of Neighborhood Watch programs and to “empower citizens to become directly involved for the purposes of homeland security and emergency preparedness.” Today, there are nearly 14,800 registered groups nationwide. The initiative has enjoyed widespread success in Southern California, particularly in the Los Angeles metropolitan area. For example, there are over 1,200 Neighborhood Watch groups in conservative Orange County.

Neighborhood Watch Encourages Abuse?

USAOnWatch is based on the premise that residents are critical in the detection, prevention and disruption of terrorism. According to the official discourse,

“USAOnWatch through Neighborhood Watch empowers citizens in our communities with the opportunities to volunteer to work toward the safety of our homeland.” The advent of this initiative can be considered an example of how the Bush administration has explicitly sought to inscribe citizens as active participants in the war on terrorism by forcing preparedness on them and encouraging them to be vigilant in their everyday lives. According to the NSA, one of the ways it aims to educate Neighborhood Watch groups on this issue is by providing its members with information on how to incorporate terrorism prevention into the mission of their Neighborhood Watch programs. One such information tool, *United for a Stronger America: Citizens’ Preparedness Guide*, was developed by the National Crime Prevention Council in partnership with the DOJ.

The guide outlines five specific themes: protecting one’s self and family; protecting and comforting children; knowing and caring for neighbors; reporting crimes and suspicious activity; and emergency preparedness. The guide instructs citizens to learn the normal routines of their neighborhood and workplace in order to be able to detect anything out of place, and to be on the lookout for suspicious activities, such as unusual conduct. Such statements are repeated in the literature of USAOnWatch, yet the citizen is not given any clear information as to what constitutes “unusual” or “suspicious” activities. This leaves the door open for abuses. The American Civil Liberties Union views this as part of “a massive effort underway to turn ⇒

regular Americans into untrained government monitors who, pressed by constant urgings for vigilance and suspicion and lacking the training or accountability of professional law enforcement officers, are asked to report to the authorities anything they think is unusual or suspicious.”

Neighborhood Watch Can Divide Communities

Community crime prevention programs such as Neighborhood Watch have come under criticism for a number of reasons. First, empirical research carried out in North America and the United Kingdom indicates that Neighborhood Watch schemes are not particularly effective in reducing crime or the fear of crime. This is mainly because levels of participation are higher in homogeneous, middle-class neighborhoods that have lower levels of crime compared to inner-city neighborhoods where the

program is less prevalent. Second, it has been suggested that in areas with community crime prevention programs, residents’ fear of crime actually increases; the constant focus on local crime problems undermines their sense of security.

Neighborhood Watch has the potential to encourage social divisiveness. By being on the lookout for “strangers” (those who are perceived as “out of place” in “this place”) and “suspicious” behavior, participants can be easily swept up in a culture of micro-vigilance that incites abuses and racial profiling simply on the grounds of “difference.” In his book *Ecology of Fear*, Mike Davis highlights this sinister side of the Neighborhood Watch program: Who gets to decide what behavior is “suspicious” and who are the “bad guys?” Davis views the focus on the threat posed by so-called outsiders and the need to defend the neighborhood as the basis of a “fortress mentality.”

In the special issue of the *Planners Network Newsletter* entitled “After September 11” (Number 149, 2001), Peter Marcuse, foreseeing that security will become the justification for measures that threaten the core of social and political life, writes that urban life will change. We should question the emphasis placed on Neighborhood Watch in the homeland security strategy, particularly given its proven ineffectiveness at reducing crime rates and fear of crime. The wider implications of USAOnWatch and the prospect of a terrorist attack, should not to be taken lightly. However, in an attempt to reconcile “safety” and “security,” breeding suspicion to the detriment of social cohesion can also be disastrous for urban life.

Marilena Liguori is a PhD. candidate in the Urban Studies program at INRS, Urbanisation, Culture et Societe, Montreal, Quebec, Canada.

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Sarah Smith, PN Administrator info@plannersnetwork.org

Planners Network

106 West Sibley Hall

Cornell University

Ithaca, NY 14853, USA

Voice: 607-254-8890

Fax: 607-255-1971

www.plannersnetwork.org

Israel's Wall in Palestine: *Control, not Security*

by GARY FIELDS

In 1989, the Berlin Wall fell and soon after that South African apartheid crumbled. At the time it appeared that such systems, with their landscapes of walls and practices of separation, would be consigned to historical memory. Today, however, there is a new generation of fear-driven landscapes, ranging from urban-based, gated communities to borderlands between nation-states, best exemplified by the border fence between the U.S. and Mexico.

These new landscapes, despite differences, share a basic similarity: they partition social differences using the built environment to preempt the circulation of groups of people across space. And nowhere are these processes of partition and separation as formidable as in Palestine.

There, entire cities are being recast as enclaves while Palestinians are routinely blocked from moving freely to homes, work and social activities by what the International Court of Justice has dubbed simply as the Wall. This structure, built by the state of Israel, is a formidable barrier, meandering for roughly 700 kilometers mostly within Palestinian territory while forging a geography of fragmented and impassible spaces. The Wall would appear to conform to the landscapes

of separation so prolific in the world today, however, if one goes beyond the visual imagery, a far different meaning for this barrier emerges.

The government of Israel states that the purpose of the Wall is "security." The Israeli state is justifiably concerned about the safety of its citizens in a conflict where civilians on both sides are continually targeted. Yet the question that emerges given the placement of the barrier largely inside Palestinian territory is, Why is it not being built on the border between Israel proper and Palestinian territory? To answer this question, we must examine the Palestinian landscape not only as a built environment of separation and preempted circulation but also as the result of a broader set of exclusionary practices stemming from the politics of dispossession and enclosure. According to Israeli architect Eyal Weizman, what is occurring is a deliberate program of remaking land and shifting populations, not a construction program of defensive fortifications. The Palestinian landscape represents an expression of power and an example of "territoriality" marked by the effort of individuals or groups to control other people and socio-economic relationships by delimiting and asserting control over a geographic area.

The Wall and the "Matrix of Control"

Rising upon the Palestinian landscape in cloaks of concrete and concertina wire, the Wall functions as part of what Jeff Halper of the Israeli Committee Against House Demolitions has termed a "matrix of control" over Palestinian territory. In addition to the Wall, this matrix consists of three types of infrastructure imposed on the landscape and designed as offensive elements for transforming Palestinian geography. These include the checkpoint, the settlement and the roads linking settlements to towns in Israel. Still under construction, the Wall, which first appeared in 2002, is actually a late entrant into this matrix, essentially reinforcing the other three elements while creating unique effects of its own. Consequently, in order to understand the Wall, we must place this edifice alongside the other elements in the matrix and analyze how these elements together create a geographical landscape of encroachment and confiscation, immobility and ex-communication. With their construction impacts, and as infrastructure of the built environment, these elements immobilize and restrict Palestinian movement within and across space and undermine and destroy Palestinian economic activity, creating economic dead zones. ⇒

The element of landscape most common in this geography of immobility and encroachment is the checkpoint, restricting both human circulation and traffic in goods. At any one time there are roughly 400 of these arrayed across Palestine ranging in scale from large terminals for human processing to modest collections of barriers and obstructions to simple but immovable concrete blocks placed on roadways to preempt cars from accessing certain routes. By immobilizing people and goods, the checkpoint severely distorts the relationship of distance and time for Palestinians and products moving from one point to another. As a consequence, the time needed to cover distance is open-ended, while distance itself is abstracted from any meaningful linear measure. A 20-kilometer trip from Bethlehem to Ramallah represents an always unknowable increment of time. Such uncertainty reinforces immobility. The trip *not* taken to visit family or

friends because of what *may be* encountered at the checkpoint is as much a part of the geography of immobility as the checkpoint itself.

The situation of Al-Haya Food Industries, a meat processing firm located in Eazaria, a Palestinian town partitioned from East Jerusalem by the Wall, illustrates the effects of the Wall on economic life. “What we are talking about from the Wall is a new market geography,” insists Banan Khatib, managing director of Al-Haya.

Historically, much of our business was in East Jerusalem. Now, because of the Wall, in order to sell to shops in East Jerusalem, we have to take travel halfway to Jericho.... Instead of a trip taking five minutes, the trip takes one hour, much longer if we cannot pass the checkpoint. Consequently, our market in

East Jerusalem has shrunk because we have no access there and the people have no access to our goods. Furthermore, labor markets in the West Bank are now completely fragmented. For some of our technical staff, we have had to rent flats here in Eazaria because some of them live far from the facility and could not get to our plant. The whole system is a complete rupture of trade and communications.

Such impacts also emphasize the role of the Wall in isolating cities and undermining the urban systems central to communications and economic life. Cities thrive not only as concentrations of resources fixed at a single locality but also as a function of connections to hinterlands and other cities. Such linkages form the networks—human, material and informational—that are the



At left: *The Wall enclosing Bethlehem.*

Photo by Gary Fields.

basis of economic development and a vibrant social and cultural life. For geographer Doreen Massey, cities embody two kinds of systems: *roots* linked to specific locations and *routes* by which cities extend beyond their boundaries. The Wall, however, disconnects these roots and routes, resulting in a fractured urban system throughout Palestine. The disconnection and territorial fragmentation, in turn, are undermining the networks of trade, production and communication between cities and villages while slowly removing Jerusalem from its historical role as the city where such networks ultimately converge. At the same time, economic life is slowly suffocating in cities such as Bethlehem and Qalqilya, which are surrounded and ghettoized by the Wall.

Israeli Settlements, Displacement and the Wall

While the checkpoint and the Wall have their own special impacts, they assume a much more profound role and meaning in conjunction with the element that enforces the geography of encroachment and displacement, the Israeli settlement. By occupying innumerable Palestinian hilltops, settlements have created impassible zones and fragmented the Palestinian landscape more dramatically than any other built form. Prior to Jewish settlement in Palestine, the Palestinian agrarian village generally occupied the middle- to upper-middle portion of the hilly terrain characteristic of the region, leaving the hilltop

for agriculture, grazing or in some instances, public recreational space. Israeli settlement, by contrast, now covets the hilltop as the site for the built-up area of towns and the landscape's commanding heights. Nowhere is this contrast in settlement patterns more obvious than in the area of Ariel, a town which sits atop several surrounding Palestinian villages. There are currently about 175 Jewish-only settlements in Palestine with a settler population of 460,000, a number that has increased unabated since the settlement program began in earnest in 1972. As these settlements become increasingly implanted throughout the territory, and as the infrastructure expands to support them (primarily roads linking settlements and cities in Israel), they take more land and encroach and displace further.

Ahmad Mohammed Ibdah is one of the farmers victimized by the construction process for the Wall. Mr. Ibdah insists on beginning his story about the Wall in 1978, when he lost twenty dunums of land to confiscation during construction of the Ariel settlement. "This was theft," he insists. On May 30, 2005, Mr. Ibdah saw his farm vanish for good when he, along with others from the village, found notices from the Israeli army in their olive trees outlining plans to take their land for construction of the Wall, ostensibly to protect the settlers of Ariel. "They destroyed 100 of my trees on ten dunums of my land," he recounts, "another 300 of my olive trees now lie on the Ariel side of the Wall, which I cannot reach...I have nothing left."

As settlements in the Occupied Territories increase and expand, so too do the efforts to control the circulation of Palestinians in and around these areas. The checkpoint and the Wall thus emerge in tandem as increasingly ubiquitous elements of landscape architecture corresponding to the ubiquity of the settlements themselves.

The Wall against Economic Livelihood

While the Wall plays a role in the geography of immobility and destruction, it plays a less well understood role in creating economic dead zones, spaces of commercial and industrial depression. Expanding throughout the West Bank, the dead zone emerges as a space where the Wall and the 60-80 meter "seam" around it encroach upon areas with commercial establishments, extinguishing the economic life of businesses while imbuing the area nearby with a depressed, abandoned character. One of the clearest examples of this phenomenon is the Jerusalem-Hebron Road at the Western entrance to Bethlehem. The once vibrant area is now bounded by a large checkpoint terminal and surrounded by the Wall, and many of its shops are now closed. Isam Albandek, the owner of Albandek Marble and Stone, describes how the Wall forty meters from his facility is destroying his livelihood. "If you look out the window," he asks, "what do you see?"

It is completely dead here. There is no traffic, no people, no transport, ⇒

no *business*. Customers who used to visit our factory do not come anymore because they either cannot come here, or they are afraid to come. And employees don't want to work here because it is difficult to get here... In addition, because I am so close to the Wall, we face the constant threat of demolition. They could come here any day and claim that we are in

a 'security area' and demolish the factory.

When looking at the enormity of the Wall in places such as Bethlehem, Jerusalem or Qalqilya, it is tempting to ascribe to it the power of fragmentation and excommunication. Indeed, it would be wrong not to imbue the structure with certain physical and technological capabilities. But just as technologies are socially constructed artifacts, so too is the Wall a socially constructed element of

architecture. In this sense, the Wall is not what is creating the system of fragmentation and excommunication. Instead, it is the ongoing policy of dispossession and enclosure that has created the Wall. The continuity of or change in this policy will determine whether the Wall will fall, or whether it becomes an enduring fixture of power on the landscape.

Gary Fields is an associate professor in the Department of Communications at the University of California, San Diego.

Hidek, cont. from p. 9

practitioners and communities, how governance and planning are affected by federal security policy and how to foster a more equitable framework for implementation in our communities. One way to accomplish this is to force our way into the security planning process by participating in an Urban Area Working Group. By federal regulation, every metropolitan area in the U.S. now maintains these regional entities. Similar to Metropolitan Planning Organizations (MPOs) in both organization and purpose, and funded by the Department of Homeland Security, these working groups allocate financial resources and set priorities for community preparedness.

There are many ways to secure a city, based on at least three main kinds of vulnerability: physical, social and human. As disaster expert Mark Pelling explains in *The Vulnerability of Cities*, physical vulnerability refers to

exposure in the built environment. Societal vulnerability, on the other hand, is concerned with exposure experienced by people and their social, economic and political systems, while human vulnerability addresses the combination of physical and societal exposure. With this as a starting point, we can develop a better understanding of the geographical and organizational dynamics of security governance. Doing so can assist with future community-based efforts in cities where federal security strategies operate, and provide findings that will enhance our approaches to contemporary debates on how to best provide urban security.

As this debate continues we must remember that despite today's ongoing political rhetoric, *communities can never be truly protected*. This means that we can fight for the abandonment of the current urban fortification strategy, which is unevenly oriented towards

protecting economic lifelines, and for a more holistic approach. Understanding how military and security technologies operate is one important step towards establishing a more equitable and realistic planning process for the security of our cities. Take heed planners, and take aggressive action to make positive change through your unique and powerful form of counterintelligence.

Matt Hidek (mahidek@maxwell.syr.edu) is a former U.S. Army Officer and federal antiterrorism analyst. He holds a M.S. in Community and Regional Planning from Temple University. Hidek is currently a PhD. candidate in social science at Syracuse University's Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs.

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From Fences to Walls on the U.S.-Mexico Boundary

by JOSEPH NEVINS

The existing, planned and proposed physical barriers along the boundary separating the U.S. and Mexico are a lightning rod for larger struggles between those who favor liberalized immigration and large segments of the U.S. population who see migrants—especially those from the so-called Third World—as threats to the country's socio-political-economic fabric. The embracing of barriers, and, more importantly, the enforcement and exclusion apparatus of which they are part, is a relatively recent development in U.S. history, one that reflects a dramatic shift in the way U.S. Americans perceive the southern borderlands and the international divide.

The issue of boundary walls came to the fore in the aftermath of the U.S. House of Representative's December 2005 approval of the Border Protection, Antiterrorism and Illegal Immigration Control Act (House Resolution 4437). Had it become law, the legislation would have led to the construction of 700 miles of additional "security fencing" along the almost 2,000-mile divide between Mexico and the United States. While the Senate ultimately rejected a similar bill (thus leading to the demise of the House version), it is nonetheless symbolic of a wider debate taking place in the U.S. about the need for walls along the U.S.-Mexico border.

One of the ways that the debate manifests itself is via language, and

more specifically, the terms one employs to characterize physical barriers along the border. While a "fence" suggests something relatively benign that one can see through or that delimits territory first and foremost rather than blocking movement, a "wall" implies something that impedes—both in terms of view and movement—and that (à la the Berlin Wall) is decidedly the antithesis of what the United States supposedly stands for (at least in the minds of the ruling classes). What matters, however, is what the barrier is intended to accomplish, and what it effectively does. In that regard, what looks like a fence can also be a wall to the extent that it prevents the trans-border movement of people.

As of late 2007, walls scar only a small portion of the U.S.-Mexico boundary. This is not to suggest that the walls are insignificant. But the increasing proliferation of physical barricades—and, more importantly, the vociferous advocacy of more of the same—is meaningful only in relation to a whole host of other factors that impede freedom of movement across the international line. Walls are just one device in an expanding toolkit of boundary and immigration enforcement. And given the widespread official and public championing of this toolkit, they are also manifestations of a dramatic shift over the last several decades in collective consciousness

and practice toward a tightening of the boundary and an exclusion of those from without who are officially undesired by Washington or scorned by large sectors of society.

Border History: From Fences to Walls

Until very recently, the number and length of barriers along the U.S.-Mexico boundary were insignificant. Until the 1990s, most were limited to relatively urbanized areas of the border region and were not effective in blocking unauthorized entrants. Since the early 1990s, however, a shift from fence-like barriers to walls began to mark the borderlands landscape.

It is unclear when the United States government first began constructing fences along the boundary, but in Nogales, Arizona (across from Nogales, Sonora) it was not until 1918 that U.S. officials first built a simple wire fence between the two towns. Gradually the fence was lengthened and strengthened so that by the mid-1960s it was a chain-link fence with barbed wire along the top. By the mid-1930s, there was also a barbed-wire fence strung between metal poles stretching eastward for about twenty miles from the Pacific Ocean. Such obstacles, however, seem to have had a very limited effect. At a U.S. Senate hearing in San Ysidro, California in 1948, for example, a federal immigration official explained, "At present ⇒

time, with no fence worthy the name [sic], it is very easy for any alien who is turned back at the port . . . to cross within a short distance of the port." A June 1958 article in the magazine *Westways* showed the fence in the westernmost part of California to be sagging and easily breachable, evidence, according to the photo caption, of "the present cordial relations between the two countries."

Unauthorized migration was of so little concern in the late 1950s that the primary justification given by James Utt, a San Diego congressman, for building a new 10-mile boundary fence from the Pacific Ocean was to prevent diseased Mexican cattle from crossing the line and contaminating U.S. dairy cattle. Part of the reason for such apathy may have been the fact that there was very little demand for unauthorized migrant workers in the San Diego area. The Bracero Program, a contract labor program that brought millions of Mexican male workers to the United States over its twenty-four years of existence, fulfilled local needs.

The lack of strong barriers reflected how immigration and boundary enforcement were non-issues for much of the twentieth century. Prior to the 1970s, the U.S.-Mexico boundary rarely received national-level attention. When it did—as around the time of the infamous Operation Wetback in 1954—it was short-lived.

But matters began to change in the late 1960s. A growing conservative-led war on crime and illicit drug use pointed the finger at Mexico as the source of the illegal commodity. There was a significant increase

in Border Patrol apprehensions of unauthorized migrants as the formally legal migrant labor influx was forced to go underground when the Bracero Program ended in 1964. Moreover, the early 1970s brought with it a deep recession and then a highly effective public relations campaign by the head of the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service during the presidency of Gerald Ford (1974-1977). Together these developments helped to bring unprecedented attention to the U.S.-Mexico border region and unauthorized migration—and create the sense of an immigration and border "crisis."

Still, public levels of concern were hardly uniform. A 1975 report on efforts to repair the boundary fence in southern California attributed the source of the effort to the San Diego Cattlemen's Association, the members of which were worried about their cattle wandering into Mexico. Yet there was also strong pressure from local and state officials and politicians in the San Diego area and elsewhere in southern California to "beef up" the boundary. In this context, federal resources for boundary enforcement increased significantly starting in the second half of the Carter administration (1978). The federal government also announced that it was considering the installation of a 10-foot high chain-link security fence along the seven westernmost miles of the divide, backed by floodlights and increased helicopter patrols.

The proposed new fence proved to be highly controversial, especially as the Carter administration

proposal evolved to include two 6-mile steel walls between San Ysidro (southern San Diego) and Tijuana, and El Paso and Ciudad Juárez. Critics of the proposal quickly dubbed the barrier the "Tortilla Curtain" or the "Carter Curtain." From the perspective of U.S. authorities, there was little question of the need for a more substantial barrier. Indeed, in many areas where there had been fencing it had been torn down. But many in San Diego, including members of its Congressional delegation and the San Diego City Council, opposed the new barrier on the grounds that it was unnecessary, would prove ineffective and would hurt U.S.-Mexico relations. Within the Mexican-American community, the opposition was very strong. In February 1979, for example, 1,300 Chicanos marched along the boundary in San Ysidro to protest the plan.

Although the proposal enjoyed widespread support within San Diego as a whole, the opposition eventually won out, as support for the barricade was not well-organized. When a new fence was eventually built, it was neither sturdier nor more difficult to scale or cut than the one it replaced. According to a June 26, 1980 article in the *San Diego Union*, within one year there were at least twenty large holes, some large enough for a truck to pass through, in the four miles of already-completed new fencing.

Yet the debate was a sign of bigger things to come. It reflected the increasing tendency of key elements of the state to present, and of the public to perceive, the

boundary as a line of protection for a country under siege from without and in need of strong boundary enforcement. Beginning in 1990, authorities began constructing a steel wall out of surplus military landing mat in the San Diego area, where the vast majority of unsanctioned migrants crossed. In comparison to the imbroglio that surrounded Carter's proposed wall, the reaction of the opposition was extremely muted, an illustration of just how deeply the boundary and its logic of exclusion had become embedded in the body politic and the collective psyche of the U.S.

Towards Consensus in Congress on National Security

Dramatic changes have taken place along the U.S.-Mexico border since the early 1990s. Physical barriers are only a small part of this apparatus. As of October 2007, there are 145 miles of various types of "fences," largely in and around towns and

cities like El Paso in Texas, Nogales, Naco and Yuma in Arizona, and San Diego, Calexico, Campo and Tecate in California, as well as in sparsely settled areas such as western Arizona. There are also fourteen miles of double and triple layers of wall-like barriers in the San Diego area. Moreover, there are scores of miles of permanent and temporary vehicle barriers in relatively rural areas where smugglers attempt to drive across the boundary. According to a June 2007 report by the Congressional Research Service, the Border Patrol, in conjunction with the National Park Service, is currently erecting an approximately 150-mile stretch of such barriers in the area near Yuma.

What gives these barriers far greater impact in terms of deterrence is that they have come about in conjunction with other enforcement-related developments. The U.S. Border Patrol—now numbering about 12,000 agents (the


vast majority stationed along the southern boundary with Mexico)—has almost tripled in size since 1994. Since that time, Washington has pumped billions of dollars into the enforcement apparatus, facilitating a huge increase in migrant detentions and imprisonment, and a massive growth in deportations.

Perhaps the most tragic manifestation of all this is the rise in the number of migrant deaths. Since 1995, well over 4,000 bodies have been recovered from the U.S.-Mexico borderlands. Many more than this have certainly perished while trying to circumvent the ever-more-formidable migrant policing apparatus along the boundary by traversing arduous terrain, but their bodies were never found.

Despite such a grisly toll, Democrats and Republicans alike champion more "security" along the boundary. While they might differ **(Continued on Page 23)**

At right: U.S. Border Patrol along the boundary wall between Jacumba, California, USA and Jacume, Baja California Norte, Mexico in 2001.

Photo by Mizue Aizeki.



Planning Biodefense: *Security and the Competitive City*

by PAUL JACKSON

According to the Trust for America's Health, the period after 9/11 has come to be "The Age of Bioterrorism." Declaring this to be an "age" only heightens the anxiety of imminent attack that has been generated to support U.S. foreign policy. It also feeds into another trend: "Biodefense readiness" is now a job for professional planners.

Tom Ridge, speaking as secretary of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), succinctly framed the political and policy environment: "Terrorism forces us to make a choice. We can be afraid. Or we can be ready." Jeffrey P. Koplan, the director of the Centers for Disease Control, stated in 2002, "Because health threats know no boundaries, we can afford no weaknesses in our public health line of defense. Either we are all protected or we are all at risk." These very clear either/or sentiments present only two options: fear *or* preparedness. Of course, no one wants to choose fear, so everyone has to be "ready." And that is a planning project. Disease, threats and biodefense readiness are now part of the planner's job description.

Cities Compete for Domestic Security Resources

In the United States, the domestic security agenda has trickled down and seeped into

the most unlikely budgets and places. The "new normal" for business and government organizations now includes disaster preparedness plans, crisis management programs, life safety plans, emergency response protocols. Hamlin County, a rural area in South Dakota, received a homeland security grant. So can you!

Security funding is now a part of competitive city policies. Politically and economically this is a windfall for those planners willing and able to consult and prepare emergency plans. Activities such as planning for public facilities, university campuses, urban economic development and infrastructure have begun to merge with planning for biodefense security and crisis management.

The process of planning for bioterrorism involves envisioning a future worst-case scenario. To develop a defense strategy, threats are transformed into vulnerabilities that must be planned for. Preparedness planning looks towards crisis, to sites of potential disorder or disruption. Preparedness planning involves searching for places and targets where bioterrorism and its associated diseases might happen. The focus is on the protection of key infrastructure (roads, electric grids, communications, food, water), key institutions (financial

markets, government facilities) and key public services (hospitals).

While there is a low probability of a bioterrorist attack, the consequences are seen as significant. Because threats can be foreseen but never predicted, the emphasis in planning is on mitigating the worst possible effects. Writing in the *New Left Review* just after 9/11, Mike Davis saw this kind of thinking as leading to the "Fear Economy," predicting that "the discrete technologies of surveillance, environmental monitoring and data processing will grow into a single integrated system. 'Security,' in other words, will become a full-fledged urban utility like water and power."

Planning domestic security now bleeds into existing urban politics and policies in multiple ways. As one example, medical researchers are attempting to find "cures" for bioterrorism, and their institutions and scientists are being promoted as part of competitive urban regions.

Bioterrorism Is not New

Over the last thirty years, approximately 285 biological and chemical agents have been used as weapons throughout the world. Most incidents have done little harm to humans, yet fear of such occurrences is used

to influence state policies. In the U.S., domestic, extreme right-wing neo-conservatives, such as anti-government militia groups and anti-abortion groups, have exploited this fear, for example, in the context of letters laced with fake toxic powder. The targets have included courthouses, IRS offices, news organizations, federal buildings and a Wal-Mart. The offices of Planned Parenthood, women's health organizations and abortion clinics have been targeted the most.

In the United States there have been two terrorist attacks against the general public that have

used disease as a weapon. The first event occurred when the Rajneeshee Cult infected salad bars in a small town in Oregon. There were no fatalities. The second event was a series of post-9/11 anthrax infections. Twenty-two people inhaled anthrax and five people died from anthrax exposure. The anthrax used in these attacks was traced to a biosafety laboratory in Fort Detrick, Maryland.

The anthrax attacks are the main justification for investment in biodefense, yet no evidence has come to light of any link between this incident and foreign terrorists.

Arguably, the anthrax attacks were not a huge escalation from the extreme right-wing groups' tactics. Still, the attacks amplified the call for preparedness and for an infrastructure to deal with future such incidents.

To be sure, bioterrorism preparedness was well underway prior to 9/11. The Clinton administration began channeling money (around \$1.5 billion) to various government departments like the National Guard. By the end of the 1990s, new think tanks, programs, institutes, conferences and publications, all on biodefense, had germinated. ⇨




Figure 1

This in turn set the stage for the post-9/11 acceleration of biodefense associations between DHS and universities.

There is a long history of university links to the U.S. military, and health and medical research have become increasingly intertwined with the domestic security strategy. The National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases (NIAID) shapes biodefense research and proudly declares the “acceleration” of its research funding programs in the direction of diseases with bioweapon potential. From 1996 to 1999, all funding that explicitly mentioned bioterrorism was awarded to one scholar: Sophia Dyer from Boston University. After 9-11, the number of researchers and the amounts awarded spiked dramatically (see Figure 1 on previous page). In 2001, there were twenty-four bioterrorism grants; by 2003, there were 519. From 1996 to 2005, the total dollar amount awarded was \$1.776 billion.

This medical research has benefited and transformed the cities in which it takes place. The financial investment has produced new laboratories and research centers that are now central to national security and bioterrorism disaster management. Many of the grants are concentrated in specific cities and at specific universities, organized in regional configurations and institutional clusters. Homeland security and competitive cities mutually

reinforce each other. Competitive cities are those that attract public and private funding, so participation in homeland security becomes closely connected to their success.

Regional Nodes in Biodefense Planning

In 2003, the *NIAID Strategic Plan for Biodefense Research* laid out the basic policy framework for the creation and funding of new regional centers for biodefense planning. One of the goals of the plan is to construct six to twelve Regional Centers of Excellence for Bioterrorism and Emerging Diseases Research (RCEs) to handle and eliminate bioterrorist attacks on laboratories, clinical personnel and adjacent communities. These facilities would develop a new generation of high-tech products and interventions to be used in a public health emergency. Biodefense also includes facility investment, research networks and talent attraction, with grants funding the construction of new facilities, named biocontainment laboratories, within “research parks.” Location is evoked to validate requests for funding. For example, Hawaii researchers claim they need funding because Hawaii has military bases, is a center for tourism and is the U.S. gateway from Asia.

Thus the regional centers have two aspects: the embedding of laboratories and science as a line of security and the strategic positioning of these clusters as a line of urban competition. The

RCEs speak of a new national infrastructure seen as a multi-city network based on the relationships between research clusters.

The RCEs are new facilities developed within universities in the wake of 9/11 to attract scientific expertise and biotechnology firms. The centers combine a research infrastructure with government institutions and public services to become central nodes in biodefense planning that benefits specific cities in a competitive political economy.

Part of the competitive city ideology is that urban futures are tied to public-private partnerships. NIAID’s plan encourages academia and industry to jointly create high-tech products along with dynamic and secure urban regions. The RCEs are “focal points” for federal, state and local agencies, in tandem with pharmaceutical and biotechnology companies. This is a direct application of economist Michael Porter’s influential policy declaration that urban prosperity lies in the clustering of leading-edge firms. These networked industrial districts promote competitiveness among entrepreneurs and institutions; and self-organization and collaboration are seen as crucial to entrepreneurial places.

The biggest winners in this game, the University of Texas Medical Branch at Galveston and Boston University, promised to provide \$50 million in matching funds. The returns on their investments

are lucrative. The national RCE in Boston is estimated to generate up to \$1.7 billion in research grants for the next twenty years, and around 2,000 new jobs, 600 of which will be permanent research positions. In Texas, a report by the Perryman Group about business activity around the University of Texas states: "In addition to the substantial contributions these [biodefense] efforts will make to the health, safety and security of the U.S. and, indeed, the world, these programs also result in a notable contribution to the economy of Texas." The report projects that over a period of twenty years the total contribution from the RCE to Texas' gross output will be \$1.1 billion. The report argues that this "will enhance the competitiveness of Texas for attracting pharmaceutical firms, emerging biotechnology enterprises and other related firms."

These developments completely side-step public participation as decisions are made outside any public planning or democratic

process. Community groups in Boston and Davis, California, have voiced opposition to these projects. Boston University BioDefense (a project of the Council for Responsible Genetics) and The Sunshine Project have been raising concerns about the lack of transparency and accountability surrounding the biodefense lab awarded to the Boston University Medical Center. But in economically hard-hit towns like Rome, New York, these laboratories are promoted as economic saviors. Progressive planners who work at universities that have a biodefense lab can, like their peers in Boston, play a similar role in questioning and raising awareness about the institutions of which they are a part.

The sobering take-home message is this: With this massive influx of federal funding, hospitals are still left out in the cold. A bioterrorist attack is first of all a public health crisis. If a bioweapon is released and people get sick, they will go to the hospital first. Hospitals

are very practical and productive sites to fund to mitigate the consequences of bioterrorism.

Hospitals and a democratic public health system are the real losers in U.S. biodefense security policy, and this does not appear to be changing. Even with the massive infusion of homeland defense funding, nearly one-third of states cut their public health budgets in 2003. The U.S. Government Accountability Office stated that while emergency plans were written, investment in hospitals was not made. Homeland security is focused on crisis events like bioterrorism; shamefully, a public and democratic health system is not in its mandate.

Paul Jackson is a PhD. candidate in the Department of Geography at University of Toronto. His research tackles the culture and politics that arise from highly infectious diseases. His previous work on security and cities with Gerda Wekerle examined how anti-terrorism policy, urban sprawl and social movements have become entangled.

Nevins, cont. from p. 19

on the details of the specific forms of border enforcement and surveillance, they share the assumption that the boundary is insufficiently guarded and that more protection against would-be threats is essential. On July 26, 2007, by a vote of 89 to 1, the Senate authorized \$3 billion to build 700 miles of additional walls and fences along the Mexican boundary, and to almost double

the size of the Border Patrol to 23,000 agents by 2009. Whether or not the bill becomes law is unclear as of this writing. But it is one of many indicators that walls—both the physical variety and the social infrastructure—are the wave of the foreseeable future in the U.S.-Mexico borderlands.

Joseph Nevins is an associate professor of geography in the Department of Earth

Science and Geography at Vassar College in Poughkeepsie, New York. His books include Operation Gatekeeper: The Rise of the "Illegal Alien" and the Making of the U.S.-Mexico Boundary (Routledge, 2002), and A Not-so-distant Horror: Mass Violence in East Timor (Cornell University Press, 2005). City Lights Books will publish his latest book, Dying to Live: A Story of U.S. Immigration in an Age of Global Apartheid, in 2008.

Sexuality, Security and Imprisonment: *The Closure of the Gay and Transgender Unit at Rikers Island*

by JUSTIN STEIL, CYNTHIA GOLEMBESKI, CARMELO LAROSE AND VANESSA AGARD-JONES

The story of the opening and closure of a special “gay unit” at the Rikers Island prison is a lesson in how spatial deconcentration can be used to reinforce discrimination and make vulnerable populations even more vulnerable.

Rikers Island is one of the world’s largest penal colonies. It currently houses an average daily population of 13,500 detainees of the New York City Department of Correction (DOC). From 1979 until 2005, there was space for 146 of those detainees to choose to identify as gay or transgender and voluntarily elect to be housed in a special unit. But in 2005, the DOC stopped admitting new detainees into the unit and dispersed those prisoners who identified as gay or transgender into the general population. A coalition of advocates (including the Sylvia Rivera Law Project, the Lambda Legal Defense Fund and others) quickly came together to oppose the closure, but the DOC shut the unit down within several months despite the protests.

The closure raises several fundamental questions about power and marginality. Why, after more than two decades, did the DOC suddenly decide to close the unit? What are the implications of its closure

for gender non-conforming prisoners? If we look at the root causes of the issues, how is the imprisonment of gender non-conforming individuals related to the regulation of public spaces? This abrupt shift in policy, from permitting voluntary segregation to enforcing mandatory dispersal, raises a number of issues relevant to the theory and practice of urban planning, particularly about the relation between space and identity and about trying to create “security” by exercising power over the distribution of particular groups in space.

The extreme inequality of power in prisons can help reveal currents that exist perhaps less visibly in the rest of society. U.S. society’s white supremacist and patriarchal underpinnings are even more acute in prisons, where control is often highly racialized and sexualized and where those with non-conforming gender identities are at a greater risk of violence.

Protest of the Closure

In the 1960s and 1970s, Rikers Island prisoners who were presumed to be gay were placed in a segregated housing area called “the homo block” where they experienced routine harassment and abuse. Strengthened by the

increasing militancy of the gay rights struggle after the Stonewall riots, gay and transgender prisoners worked with the Legal Aid Society to sue the DOC in response to this discriminatory treatment. As a result of the suit, advocates won a consent decree in 1978 that formalized the creation of a “gay unit,” the entrance to which had to be totally voluntary. This court order remained in effect from 1979 until 2000, when the Prison Litigation Reform Act enabled prisons to have existing consent decrees rescinded if there were no known ongoing constitutional violations. Nevertheless, the status quo at Rikers remained until October of 2005 when the DOC announced it was going to phase out the “gay unit.”

In justifying the unit’s closure, DOC Commissioner Martin Horn pointed to the detainees’ ability to exercise choice over their residence: “It was the only place in the department where inmates got to choose where they lived and who they lived with. No other group of inmates could do that. Latin Kings couldn’t say they wanted to live with Latin Kings, nor would we allow them to.” In the process of critiquing this right to exercise choice over residence, Horn did not discuss the origins of the unit in response to

gendered and sexualized violence by correctional officers and other prisoners, but instead compared gay and transgender identities to membership in a group popularly identified as a gang. He dismissed the idea of queer and gender non-conforming prisoners as being members of a protected class.

Commissioner Horn presented the closure as a decision made to protect and ensure the well-being of the unit's residents, saying, "What we ended up with was this housing unit where people were predatory and people were vulnerable. The very units that should be the safest, in fact, had become the least safe." Transgender prisoners and advocates argued that the unit was safer than the general population and pointed to the consistent choice by transgender prisoners to request placement there.

To substantiate his claim that the unit was closed for the safety of its residents, Horn cited the statistic that in 2004, the rates of inmate-on-inmate assault and use of force by correctional officers in the unit were significantly higher than in the general population. Franklin Romeo of the Lambda Legal Defense Fund and D. Horowitz of the Sylvia Rivera Law Project claimed that it would be more accurate to compare the rates of assault against the prisoners in the "gay unit" to the rates of assault these same individuals would expect if they were in the general population. Advocates for transgender prisoners also questioned what kinds of assault were included

in the statistics and pointed out the prisoners in a small unit such as this one would be more likely to report assaults than prisoners in the general population. The comparison of the two statistics is further complicated by the widely varying sample size between the two comparison groups—146 in the "gay unit" compared to over 13,000 in the whole prison.

Prisoners who had been in the unit reported feeling safer there,

Prisoners who had been in the gay unit reported feeling safer there, from assault by other prisoners and abuse by correctional officers.

both from assault by other prisoners and from abuse by correctional officers. Prisoners felt that correctional officers in the unit were better at responding to gay and transgender issues because the officers had either chosen or been assigned to the unit because they had relevant skills. Prisoners also reported an increased level of comfort in being with other similarly situated people. Though access to medical and social services is limited throughout Rikers Island, residents of the unit suggested that access to services there was as good as or better than in the general population.

Transgender activist Mariah Lopez experienced both the "gay unit" as well as the general population in Rikers when she was imprisoned on prostitution charges. Lopez says that while she was the victim of verbal and physical abuse while in the

general population, that was not her experiences in the gay unit.

In response to the concerns of prisoners and advocates about safety in the general prison population, the DOC said that gay or transgender prisoners could apply to be placed in protective custody, which locks prisoners in individual cells for twenty-three hours a day in conditions similar to solitary confinement. Advocates argue that the protective

custody option essentially ends up punishing people for the discrimination against them and would force upon gay and transgender prisoners an unfair choice between risking assault and being locked in solitary confinement.

Implications of the Closure

In the highly unequal environment of a prison, the quest for safety and power through self-segregation is a consciousness-raising act. The very existence of the gay unit allowed gay and transgender prisoners to find more support and solidarity than they would have otherwise.

When the DOC announced the unit's closure, a broad coalition came together in opposition. No individual or group issued public statements in support of the DOC's position. In the eyes of transgender prisoners and advocates, the closure represents ⇨

the loss of a space that worked to meet the unique needs of the transgender population in an inherently unsafe environment. Dispersing the population hides the discrimination that gay and transgender prisoners experience, at the same time implying that the increased violence is somehow their fault.

The decision to disperse the transgender population corresponds in many ways with a larger trend in planning and social policy toward deconcentration. In examining the spatial embeddedness of power, urban scholars have focused largely on “ghettos” as examples of how states exert power over minority groups through spatial concentration. This focus has contributed to an emphasis on policies of deconcentration, dispersal and redesign as a way to redress the problems presented by spatial concentration and segregation. It should be noted, however, that states can also exercise power through dispersal.

At Rikers, a minority group chose segregation and the state mandated their dispersal. The DOC claimed dispersal would

benefit this group and effectively blamed them for “provoking” discrimination against their own members. The experiences of transgender prisoners at Rikers Island remind us that we must not focus simply on the existence of segregation, but that we must also take into account the reasons for the spatial differentiation and the degree of choice involved in creating this segregation. Dispersal as a remedy for segregation does not necessarily further the ends of quality care or of social justice.

A fundamental question ignored throughout much of the debate surrounding the unit’s closure has been the way in which the high imprisonment rates of gender non-conforming individuals is tied inextricably to discrimination against them. A progressive response to the situation would include efforts to make prisons obsolete, beginning by transforming the social and spatial conditions that lead to the criminalization of those who challenge accepted definitions of gender. This would require redefining our understandings of safety and freedom to recognize the significance of self-determining communities that can resolve

conflicts without resorting to the penal system or punitive sanctions.

Planners play a crucial role in negotiating relations between space and identity. Ensuring that urban policies support the maintenance of public spaces where diverse groups can congregate and challenge the criminalization of marginalized groups through discriminatory policing practices could contribute to a decrease in the number of transgender individuals imprisoned to begin with.

Justin Steil is a JD/PhD. candidate in urban planning at Columbia University and has taught drama, creative writing and GED for ten years in prisons and jails. Cynthia Golembeski is a PhD. candidate in sociology at University of Wisconsin-Madison and has taught in prisons as well as worked with recently released individuals. Carmelo Larose is a PhD. candidate in English at New York University. Vanessa Agard-Jones formerly served as the coordinator of the Prison Activist Resource Center in Oakland and is currently a PhD. student in anthropology and French studies at New York University, focusing on race and the cultural politics of memory in France.

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“Critical Incidents” or Business as Usual? Planning and Aboriginal Protest in Ontario

by HEATHER DORRIES

Protest by Canada’s Aboriginals, although usually peaceful, is increasingly considered a “problem” of law and order by the mainstream media. Aboriginal land is therefore considered illegitimate, and the occupation of Aboriginal land by colonial settlers goes largely unquestioned. It is not always clear, however, how planning creates and prolongs the conflict over land use and ownership and normalizes a reactive set of relations between Aboriginal peoples, settlers and the government. In a subtle way, planning is contributing to the criminalization of Aboriginal protest.

Rise of Aboriginal Protests

Protests—or “Aboriginal critical incidents,” as they are referred to by the provincial police—are increasingly common in Ontario as rapid urban growth increases the demand for land. Much of the land in Ontario is subject to unresolved Aboriginal land claims, setting the stage for conflict between Aboriginal groups, developers and municipalities.

Since February 2006, land scheduled to become a 72-home subdivision in the southern Ontario town of Caledonia has been the site of a protest. The protest began when a group

of women from the nearby Six Nations reserve began a peaceful “reclamation” of the land on which the subdivision is to be located. They argued that these lands were never surrendered and thus remain part of their rightful territory. The women intended to occupy the site until the land was returned to the Six Nations.

In March 2006, the provincial police delivered a court injunction, issued at the request of the developer, ordering the protesters to leave the site. Many protesters chose not to leave the site and were removed by the police. Eighteen people were charged with contempt of court, and one person spent several months in jail. Over the summer of 2006 there was a road blockade and several confrontations between Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal people. While the provincial government has since purchased the land from the developer, the land claim remains unresolved and a source of conflict within the community.

As of Right?

The land use planning system in Ontario is based on an as-of-right approach to land rights. Landowners have the right to develop their land as they see fit, as long as the development

conforms to established zoning and land use regulations.

The provincial government is responsible for creating broader policies that guide land use and development while the task of regulating land use is delegated to municipalities. Municipalities are given the power to create plans and written ordinances, such as official plans and zoning by-laws. These plans represent a statement of intent regarding future decision-making and together provide a description of all the types of allowable development. It is believed that this approach provides a great deal of flexibility to landowners while preventing incompatible uses.

The notion of private property is central to this approach to planning. Although property rights are not guaranteed by the Canadian constitution, the as-of-right approach to development control confers upon landowners a set of development rights. Landowners have the right to develop their land as they see fit, as long as the development conforms to the zoning and land use regulations set by municipalities. These rights contribute to the security of land ownership. In situations where land title is contested, Aboriginal land rights are necessarily denied, ⇨

and planning effectively limits the ability of Aboriginal peoples to lay claim to the land.

Settlement and Sprawl

Prior to European settlement, the people of the Six Nations (a confederacy of the Mohawk, Oneida, Onandaga, Cayuga, Seneca and Tuscarora nations, together known as the Haudenosaunee) occupied an area that covered most of the land surrounding the Great Lakes. Contemporary land claims have their legal basis in historical treaties made between the Six Nations and various European settlers. At the root of the Caledonia controversy is the Haldimand Land Grant of 1784. This land grant “authorized” the Six Nations to possess all of the land six miles on each side of the Grand River from its mouth to the source. These lands were granted in recognition of the loss of the traditional territory of the Six Nations as a result of the American War of Independence. The land grant also established that the federal government would hold the land in trust and protect the land to ensure that Six Nations would have sole use of it. Over the past 200 years, however, the government has actively encouraged settlement on these lands instead of preserving sole use of the land for Six Nations.

The existence of the Haldimand Land Grant itself is not contested today, however, its legal meaning is. The Six Nations believe the Haldimand Grant affirmed its legal title to the land. The federal

government argues that the grant only recognized the right of the Six Nations to occupy the land and that modern land titles erase Aboriginal claims to it.

Settlement and urban development in Southern Ontario has had negative effects on the people of Six Nations. As the city of Toronto continues to expand at a rapid pace, there is increasing pressure to develop lands located within the traditional territory of the Six Nations. Attempts by the provincial government to curb urban sprawl and protect farmland through the creation of a “Green Belt” around Toronto have only further agitated the situation by forcing developers and homebuyers to look farther away from the city and closer to the territory of the Six Nations. In addition, many of the sites designated in the provincial growth plan as “targeted growth areas” are also situated on lands subject to land claims.

Urban sprawl has also led to loss of animal habitats and the elimination of indigenous species, reduced the amount of land available for traditional uses, damaged drinking water sources and made it difficult for the people of Six Nations to exercise their treaty rights to hunt and fish. Although people of Six Nations have been able to document many of the negative effects they have experienced as a result of urbanization, opportunities to influence the pace or location of development are extremely limited. Thus, protest is often seen as an effective last resort to voicing opposition to urban development.

Land Claims

In 1995, Six Nations filed a land claim with the federal government on twenty-eight different pieces of land located throughout the Haldimand Tract. The land on which the housing development is located is one part of the claim. This land was granted to the Six Nations under the Haldimand Proclamation. In the 1830s, the Crown approached Six Nations about the development of these lands. Believing that the tribe could not prevent the development, Six Nations leased this land to the Crown. However, over time the Crown sold the lands to third parties, in breach of the original lease agreement.

In 2004, a developer filed an application to re-zone the land for residential purposes as well as a development application that included the construction of housing. The application was approved by the county council after required environmental and archaeological concerns had been considered. The outstanding land claim, however, was not taken into consideration.

Currently, there are 156 outstanding Aboriginal land claims against the federal government in Ontario. An additional forty-nine claims are being litigated and new claims are filed each year. Other land claims have been filed against the government of Ontario. Current federal and provincial policies are not capable of resolving the majority of claims in a timely way. It can take anywhere from twenty to thirty years for a claim to make

its way through the legal system; a variety of systemic disincentives account for the slow speed at which claims are resolved.

Despite the potential for conflict created by the development of lands that are subject to unresolved land claims, provincial planning policy provides no guidance to planners on how the presence of land claims should factor into planning decisions. Thus, while the standoff in Caledonia has been treated largely as an issue of civil disobedience, the role of the land development system—which is managed primarily by planners—has been largely ignored by both planners and politicians alike.

Planning Inaction

Aboriginal peoples do not have a lot of influence on land use decision-making in urban areas. While they are included as part of stakeholder consultation in the development of provincial policies on land use and development, their voices often go unheard. Although representatives of Aboriginal groups have been calling for the *Planning Act* to specifically deal with land claims since 1995, this issue has yet to be explicitly addressed in provincial planning policy.

Invisibility of Aboriginal aspirations in contemporary land use plans is not due to an innocent oversight on the part of planners. Rather, the inability of planning to recognize Aboriginal aspirations can be traced to the exclusionary politics of planning.

Approaches to planning in Ontario have necessitated protest as one of the only ways in which Aboriginal peoples can ensure that their concerns are heard. Protests symbolize the kind of reactive relationship that is necessitated by a land use planning system that fails to recognize Aboriginal land rights.

Given their role as administrators of land policy, and given their power to influence the approval of development applications and by-law amendments, it is clear that planners have played a significant role in the creation of this conflict. This dispute also highlights the fact that urban planners are poorly equipped to deal with land disputes.

The reluctance of planners and policymakers to acknowledge responsibility became strikingly apparent to me as I interviewed people about the land disputes. While members of the Aboriginal community were generous with their time and eager to share their experiences, I found it difficult to find planners who were willing to be interviewed. The municipal planners who agreed to be interviewed were reluctant to speak “on the record” and requested to remain anonymous. They expressed frustration with the lack of guidance from provincial policymakers on how to deal with land claims. None of the planners associated with the provincial ministry who are responsible for urban development agreed to be interviewed. Many declined on the grounds that they were “not responsible” for dealing with land claims, although some did admit that it was an “interesting topic.”

As a result of this non-interventionist approach, planning at the municipal level has become a largely administrative activity. The process of reviewing development applications and approvals is a matter of confirming that a development application conforms to established regulations. Nevertheless, as the situation in Caledonia clearly demonstrates, planning is much more than a simple administrative matter. Planning in the context of unresolved land claims is a highly political activity.

Current approaches to land use and development planning in Ontario also fail to capture the profound significance of land in Aboriginal cultures. The cultural logic of planning rules and institutions erases both prior Aboriginal presence and existing relationships between people and the environment.

And as a pretext for ignoring Aboriginal land claims, Aboriginal protest continues to be seen by politicians, the media and planners alike as a problem of “law and order.”

Heather Dorries is a PhD student in urban planning at the University of Toronto. Her research focuses on Aboriginal responses to urban development and approaches to environmental planning. She would like to thank the many people at Six Nations who generously shared their time and experiences with her and enabled her to write this article.

The U.S. Social Forum: *Major Success for Networking*

by PETER MARCUSE

The U.S. Social Forum in Atlanta this July was a major success. There were some 10,000 people in attendance, 951 workshops and four plenaries, along with lots of culture, tents, networking and solidarity. It was amazingly grassroots. Almost everything was bilingual and a range of groups were represented; there were many Hispanic and African-American, homeless, gay and lesbian and youth participants (but few elderly or indigenous). The majority of attendees were probably women, and it was overwhelmingly community-based rather than NGO-dominated (a complaint about the Nairobi World Social Forum). There were relatively few academics present and more activist leaders rather than big-name speakers. There was also much attention to movement-building and leadership training.

Almost every hot-button issue was represented at the forum, including Iraq, health care, immigration, global trade, labor rights, prison rights, indigenous rights, education, Hurricane Katrina and the media. While it was of course overwhelmingly anti-Bush, there was no electioneering. Urban issues, such as housing, were present but not dominant, and they tended to be taken up in themes organized by sector.

If the forum had two purposes, networking and coalition-building, the former succeeded admirably, the latter less so. People working on the same issues came together to share experiences and offer mutual support, and while the plenaries helped bring people together, the scattered locations did not. The idea of the forum is, of course, to be a place for open discussion, not itself an action organization. One of the two efforts that I was aware of to mobilize across issues on a broader action agenda was a remarkable group just founded in January, the Right to the City Alliance. This effort includes twenty-four grassroots activist groups from nine cities. Members include community, immigrant, housing, workers, Asian and gay and lesbian organizations, among others. They are focused on a down-to-earth interpretation of the broad

formulation of the right to the city that first emerged in 1968. A few academics and professionals support this movement, but it is clearly led by community activists.

The other cross-issue organizing effort was the Peoples Movement Assembly, which had met parallel to and outside of past forums. It organized regional meetings in Atlanta that brought people together across issues on a regional basis, but the regions are too big, I believe, to be viable (the Northeast, for example, includes Boston to D.C.). A one-and-a-half hour session isn't enough to get anything done beyond forming a coordinating committee; at least, this was the experience in the one session I was at. There was a general meeting of the assembly on Sunday morning, at which a number of substantive resolutions were passed, but I wasn't able to be at it. I understand there is ongoing discussion about how to legitimate the resolutions and obtain endorsements from the groups represented.

If in fact there is impetus to having the range of resolutions of the assembly submitted to the many organizations at the meeting, I think it would be a major contribution to broad coalition-building and unity. It would mean each group would consider, debate and vote on resolutions outside of its own particular concern and turf, for example, environmentalists would vote on gender equality, housing groups on civil rights, anti-war groups on health care, etc. That would mean a broadening of all concerns, a giant step forward. The idea of the forum and the assembly as two separate but linked events, with different but related functions, independent of each other but drawing support from each other, seems to me a very desirable development, a way around a tension that has been present in many forum discussions: Is the forum an open space for discussion or is it a movement around a defined agenda?

The two Planners Network sessions I was involved with in Atlanta were reasonably **(Continued on Page 23)**

Hurricane Katrina and Environmental Justice

by DAVID E. JOHNSON

Wide coverage of New Orleans rebuilding in the wake of Hurricane Katrina, including articles in the last two issues of *Progressive Planning*, illuminates the extent to which the federal government has ignored and undermined environmental justice. Though a long history of federal rules and regulations mandate a policy of environmental justice, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) has consistently violated these rules in the face of the imminent threat and aftermath of Katrina.

Early Federal Rules

Until the 1990s, Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act and the 1969 National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) were the primary federal policies that addressed environmental justice for minorities and the poor in the United States. According to Elizabeth Deakin, associate professor of city and regional planning and director of the Transportation Center at University of California-Berkeley, Title VI has two relevant provisions. The first, Section 601, bars racial and ethnic discrimination in any federally funded program:

No person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving federal financial assistance.

The second, Section 602, authorizes federal agencies to promulgate rules and regulations implementing section 601, stating in part:

Each federal department and agency which is empowered to extend federal financial assistance to any program or activity, by way of grant, loan or contract other than a contract of insurance or guaranty, is authorized and directed to effectuate the provisions of section

[601] of this title with respect to such program or activity by issuing rules, regulations or orders of general applicability which shall be consistent with achievement of the objectives of the statute authorizing the financial assistance in connection with which the action is taken.

NEPA indirectly includes environmental justice elements in the public review process, which must take into consideration the socio-economic impacts of projects. All federal, state and local governments that receive federal funding are required to implement the environmental review process.

Also, according to Deakin, "... the Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act (ISTEA) of 1991 and its successor, the Transportation Equity Act for the 21st Century (TEA-21), mandate increased public participation and specifically call out the need to increase the involvement of 'traditionally underrepresented groups, including low-income and minority populations.'"

Executive Order 12898

Executive Order (EO) 12898, signed by President Bill Clinton in 1994, directs federal agencies to make environmental justice part of their mission by identifying and addressing, as appropriate, disproportionate and adverse health or environmental effects of their activities on minority and low-income populations.

Far from rejecting this approach, it remains part of FEMA's mission. FEMA's website recognizes the EO and states:

Each federal agency must make achieving environmental justice part of its mission by identifying and addressing, as appropriate, disproportionately high and adverse human health, environmental, economic and social

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effects of its programs, policies and activities on minority and low-income populations, particularly when such analysis is required by NEPA. The EO emphasizes the importance of NEPA's public participation process, directing that each federal agency shall provide opportunities for community input in the NEPA process. Agencies are further directed to identify potential effects and mitigation measures in consultation with affected communities . . .

The website of the American Association of State Highway Officials (AASHTO) provides more detail on EO 12898 and includes the April 1997 U.S. Department of Transportation Order on Environmental Justice. It summarizes and expands on the requirements of EO 12898 and requires integration of environmental justice in the NEPA process through analysis of environmental justice impacts and public involvement.

Failure to Implement EO 12898

Federal agencies have not fully implemented nor consistently integrated environmental justice into their day-to-day operations. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has not identified minority and low-income populations, or populations addressed in the EO, and has neither defined nor developed criteria for disproportionately impacted populations. In 2001, the

EPA restated its commitment to environmental justice in a manner that does not emphasize minority and low-income populations as the EO had.

There is no evidence that FEMA has implemented or consistently integrated environmental justice into its emergency evacuation plans for New Orleans or southeastern Louisiana. Could this be related to FEMA's slow response to rescuing tens of thousands of minority and poor citizens of New Orleans during Hurricane Katrina, or was this just the result of a lack of coordinated, continuous and comprehensive evacuation and recovery planning between federal, state and local agencies?

Finally, perhaps FEMA planners should consult the American Institute of Certified Planners' Code of Ethics, which states, "A planner must strive to expand choice and opportunity for all persons, recognizing a special responsibility to plan for the needs of disadvantaged groups and persons, and must urge the alteration of policies, institutions and decisions which oppose such needs."

David E. Johnson is a transportation and environmental planner with over twenty years of experience working on highway, rail and bridge projects in the San Francisco Bay Area. He holds a degree in geography from San Francisco State University.

Marcuse, cont. from p. 30

attended, but the competition was fierce and we were placed fairly far from the Convention Center. One, that Amanda Huron led, explored mapping to show urban issues. The other, where I and others in planning spoke, was co-sponsored by Picture the Homeless, a sophisticated grassroots group from New York that had a very impressive group of members there, and had produced a very good report on making empty housing available to the homeless. Both sessions went well substantively. I saw only a handful of PN members that I recognized at the forum, but it was a big rambling three day affair and easy to miss people. It was also very different from the kind of professional, academic or political conferences we generally attend. Every single session (except plenaries) was in a circle, there

were never questions to experts and there were no time limits on people speaking in workshops. There was a maximum of stories told and experiences shared, all sometimes at the expense of coherence and information, but almost always productive—and certainly democratic.

I think supporting the kinds of movements and groups represented at the forum is very much along the lines that Planners Network has been moving. They are the ones we should be working for. They can teach us about organizing and can also benefit from some of our planning bag of tricks—tools and analysis.

Peter Marcuse is a faculty member at Columbia University.

Constitutional Reforms in Venezuela Foretell a Planning Revolution

by CLARA IRAZÁBAL

The National Assembly of Venezuela is discussing a proposal by President Hugo Chávez to change thirty-three of the 350 articles of the Constitution of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela. The proposed changes would create new forms of land tenure and restructure the nation's governance system, both of which are essential to urban planning. The proposal will be submitted to a national referendum in December. Given current popular support for the Chávez government, it is expected that the reform will be approved.

Chávez supporters see the reforms as a necessary step to deepen their "revolutionary process" toward a democratic "socialism of the twenty-first century." The changes attempt to address the obstacles posed by a corrupt and ineffective bureaucracy created largely as a result of the huge surplus from Venezuela's petroleum-dependent economy. The bureaucracy has often paralyzed and sabotaged the revolutionary process. The Venezuelan Bolivarian Revolution has often been criticized for both continuing the corrupt, bureaucratic status quo and consolidating state power in the hands of a single individual. While both these conditions exist, they do not account for the most significant element of the revolutionary process, what George Ciccariello-Maher calls "the explosion of communal power." Communal power is to be found in the dynamic community-based movements that make up the largest base of power for Chávez, including new "community councils" being formed in many neighborhoods. The constitutional reform seeks to consolidate and expand communal power, transform the bureaucracy and provide the president with more ways to maneuver around the obstacles to decentralization, devolution and socialization of the economy.

New Forms of Land Tenure

The classification of property in the proposed reform leaves unchanged both the right to and protection of private property and the right of the government to take property for public purposes in exchange for adequate compensation (similar to provisions in the U.S. and Western Europe). Other forms of property would be established, however, including: public (fully owned and managed by the government); social (owned by the people and either managed by the government or by communities or other institutions); collective (owned and managed by groups of individuals for their particular uses); and mixed (a combination of ownership and management). The new classification of property is meant to support further diversification in the forms of social organization and economic activity.

New Governance Structure

The constitutional reform would maintain preexisting political-territorial entities in the country and also create new maritime regions, insular districts, cities, communes, federal provinces, functional districts and special military regions. Within cities, *communes* would be units smaller than municipalities in which individuals and community organizations could engage more actively in governmental affairs. *Federal provinces* would help the national government funnel resources into less developed areas and integrate them into the regional and national development plans. The reform, then, proposes mechanisms to transfer resources and services from the upper levels of government to community and neighborhood organizations that request them, including in the areas of housing, culture, environment, political participation and economy. It is expected that the new geometry of power **(Continued on Page 37)**

Challenging Coke's Thirst for Water: *The Apizaco Story*

by MARIE KENNEDY AND CHRIS TILLY


"A few days a week, foul-smelling black mud comes out of the plant," Javier told us as he sat a short distance downstream from the Coca-Cola plant in Apizaco, Mexico. Javier, a small farmer getting on in years, has been tending his cows along the Apizquito River for decades. "The spring is about four kilometers up to the east. The water comes out sweet and clean there, but by the time it gets here it's polluted."

Coca-Cola has run a bottling plant in Apizaco, a regional transportation hub in the central Mexican state of Tlaxcala, for twenty-five years. Only recently has it begun to generate controversy, largely because a combative mayor, Reyes Ruíz Peña, has challenged Coke's voracious consumption of water to supply "the real thing" to Tlaxcala and three larger neighboring states. So far, the mayor says, the mega-corporation has been slow to respond—as well it might, since due to quirks in Mexican law, Ruíz has no legal power to regulate the plant, and the final months of his term are winding down.

Global Glutton

The Apizaco dispute is a window on a global phenomenon. To serve billions of Cokes every year, Coca-Cola must extract billions of gallons of water—it takes four gallons of water to produce a gallon of Coke—and dump enormous amounts of toxic wastes. To reap economies of scale, the cola giant does not sip a little water here and a little there; its bottleries sink roots into a few water-rich areas, and over time, literally suck them dry. Peasant women in Kerala, India, camped out in front of the local Coke plant for two years to defend their water supply. They ultimately triumphed. The plant was closed and the state passed a law banning sales of Coke and Pepsi, and Coke- and Pepsi-free zones have since sprung up all over India.

Mexico consumes more Coke per capita than any other country in the world—438 8-ounce portions of the beverage a year per person, well over one a day. Coca-Cola FEMSA, Mexico's Coke bottler (a joint venture between Coca-Cola and the giant Mexican corporation that runs one of Mexico's two main beer companies and the Oxxo chain of convenience stores), was recently fined 10.5 million pesos (about \$1 million) for monopolistic practices.



Javier, a small farmer near the Coke plant.
Photo by Marie Kennedy.

In San Cristóbal de las Casas in the southern state of Chiapas, a campaign spearheaded by environmentalists has called for a Coke boycott to protest the depredations of the local bottling plant that is putting the lush region's aquifer in danger. On the whole, however, *refresco-crazy* Mexicans

have so far not embraced the issue. Even the militantly anti-capitalist Zapatista movement, based nearby in Chiapas, has not joined the boycott. “We have a way to get rid of Coke,” joked the voluble Zapatista spokesman Subcomandante Marcos. “We will drink every last bottle.”

Dry Times in Apizaquito

The recent stirrings in Apizaquito promise to open a second front in Mexico’s soda skirmish. The central figure, Reyes Ruíz, is a charismatic and blunt-spoken political maverick who ran on the ticket of the tiny Workers’ Party and defeated the candidates of Mexico’s three major parties. “They call him the ‘*globafóbico*’ (antiglobalization) mayor,” commented one reporter, “because he’s always criticizing corporations or the government.” According to Ruíz, he took note of the Coca-Cola plant during his campaign when residents of the Apizaquito *barrio*, where the bottler is located, began complaining to him. They grumbled about traffic congestion, damage to the roads by Coke’s heavy trucks and pollution, but above all, a shrinking of the water supply. As Ruíz related, they said, “Help us make sure the company either leaves or helps us.”

Over its twenty-five years of operation in Apizaco, the Coca-Cola plant has expanded constantly. “That area used to be all farmland,” Ruíz said. “They started by drilling one well, really just for exploration. Now I don’t know how many wells they’re exploiting.” What he does know, he said, is that the water level in the aquifer that supplies the bottler had dropped considerably.

Coca-Cola FEMSA (which responded to our request for an interview by setting up a meeting with four executives as well as providing written answers to questions) denies Ruíz’s charges. Referring to figures from Mexico’s National Water Commission (CNA), they claim that industry accounts for only 12 percent of water use in the region (and their bottling for just over 1 percent). A CNA study, they note, reports “that the aquifer is recharging adequately” —in fact, according to this study, twenty-two more water users the

size of the Coke plant could be added before the aquifer would begin to be drawn down. Coke would not give us a precise figure for its water use, but stated that it remains within the 450 million gallons per year allotted it by the CNA. “We comply with the law,” Marco Antonio Dehesa, project engineer with Coca-Cola FEMSA, repeated to us over and over.

Ruíz maintains that the CNA’s public figures cannot be believed. He says he asked Coke for water use figures two years ago, was promised a response, but still has not received one. The city government has little leverage over the corporation because the CNA grants permits for water extraction. (Ruíz also asked the Commission for water use statistics, but again says he has gotten the runaround.) “I told FEMSA,




Apizaco’s Mayor Reyes Ruíz Peña.
Photo by Marie Kennedy.

you’re not going to have an ‘arrangement’ with me,” he declared, hinting that the commission may have worked out such a pact. He has contracted the city’s own water use study, to be completed by late summer 2007.

Javier, the neighboring farmer, agrees with Ruíz’s assessment. “The springs are going down because they just take, take, take.” In fact, the impact of increased water consumption by the bottler and ⇒

other users (Coke is the city's largest business, but another water sponge is Procter & Gamble's paper mill) appears to extend beyond the Apizaquito neighborhood. Gloria Estudillo, a resident of central Apizaco, reported that over the years the water supply there had also become irregular. She commented, "We haven't had water for eight days, and that never used to happen." In fact, even Coke's Dehesa conceded that, official figures or not, it's



Smelly water is discharged from Coke plant.
Photo by Marie Kennedy.

clear the water level has fallen: "Twenty years ago, water rose to the surface in springs—you didn't even need to drill a well here. Now you have to drill a well and pump it up."

"It Sometimes Needs Adjustment"

Then there's the pollution. Coke runs a water treatment plant to purify its wastewater, "but they're still polluting," said Ruíz. Javier agreed, "Many trees have been dying along the river

because of the contamination. Even though they say they have a treatment plant, they're not actually purifying the water." Indeed, though we did not see the "black mud" described by Javier, on one day we visited, the water discharged from the plant came out milky white with a strong unpleasant smell (on another day the smell was gone). Coca-Cola FEMSA stated that discharged water "is always 100 percent treated," but when we mentioned our observations, plant manager Juan Carlos Lucio acknowledged that, "Like any industrial process, it sometimes needs adjustment."

In Kerala, India, tests done on the waste from the Coke bottling plant showed high levels of cadmium and lead, which are linked to cancer and kidney and liver disorders. Closure of the plant there was initially ordered because of contamination of drinking water from Coca-Cola's toxic waste, not because of water depletion. Mexican Coke spokespeople were unaware of the Kerala case, but noted that "the production process is essentially the same all over the world," a not very comforting point.

Coke has given Apizaco a number of concessions: a new pump and other improvements in the city's nearby well, some paving materials, jobs (again, Ruíz and the corporation disagree on how many) and contributions to some community events. Still, said Ruíz, with Coca-Cola FEMSA earning an estimated \$500,000 a day in profits from the plant, "We think they need to take more responsibility than that."

Leverage Points

Though Apizaco issues an annual operation permit to the bottler, as the mayor explained, "As long as they pay their 10,000 pesos (about \$900) each year, we can't take away the permit. We don't have the legal power to close the plant." In any case, his government would prefer to keep the plant functioning—but with a sustainable level of water use.

Octavio Rosas, an economist at the National Autonomous University of Mexico (UNAM), Mexico's national university, observed that Apizaco's

problem is far from unique. “When municipal governments want to defend their own people, they must confront legal obstacles that prevent them from acting because the issues fall under federal



A shoeshine stand in Apizaco with conflicting messages.
Photo by Marie Kennedy.

jurisdiction—as in the case of water.” In the long run, Ruíz argued,

We need laws that would permit us to do things in an honest manner. The law should require employers to be socially responsible. If they take water from the community, they should give something in

return to improve the quality of life—jobs, help with education and health services. And the extraction of water would be controlled, limited to a fixed amount.

But for Ruíz as mayor, there is no long run. His term of office ends in January 2008 (Mexican mayors are elected for three years, without the possibility of re-election). With no legal leverage, what options are left? “The citizens would have to shut down the plant,” is Ruíz’s blunt response. To be sure, such dramatic action takes more than an outspoken mayor and a disgruntled population. So far, no serious grassroots organization has stepped forward to take the lead. But Mexicans have a long tradition of taking direct action, such as sit-ins and land occupations, to press their demands. In late June, a day-long Environmental Monitoring Caravan for the states of Tlaxcala and Puebla, representing an unprecedented twenty-seven citizens’ organizations, made a special stop in Texcalac, the community next door to Apizaco, to highlight the water issue. If Apizaco activism emerges to join forces with the Chiapas boycott, Coca-Cola’s Mexican bottling operation could well find itself capped.

Marie Kennedy and Chris Tilly recently spent six months based at the Colegio de Tlaxcala in Mexico, where Kennedy was a Fulbright Scholar. Kennedy is professor emerita of community planning at the University of Massachusetts Boston and Tilly is professor of regional economic and social development at the University of Massachusetts Lowell. Kennedy is the co-chair of the Planners Network Steering Committee and on the editorial board of Progressive Planning

Irazábal , cont. from p. 33

created by the reform will promote both greater organization and participation of citizen groups at the grassroots level and greater cross-sectoral coordination of plans at the regional level.

Implementation of these changes would no doubt be difficult; the risks are significant and the level of success in advancing the revolutionary project overall remains to be seen. As in all reforms and revolutions, the easy part will be changing the law, the hard part

will be changing the social relations. But changing the legal structure at this point may also contribute to the ongoing transformation of social relations. Venezuela is, arguably, undertaking the greatest experiment of socialist planning in the world today, and we need to pay attention as it unfolds.

Clara Irazábal (irazabal@usc.edu) is assistant professor in the School of Policy, Planning and Development, University of Southern California, Los Angeles.

Resources

PN NEWS

From the PN Steering Committee:

1) New Steering Committee Members

PNers elected a new Steering Committee (SC) this summer. Below are the new SC members and their e-mail addresses. Two additional members have also joined the steering committee as representatives of the new Young Planners Network.

- Ann Forsyth (Treasurer)
af16@cornell.edu
- Tom Angotti:
tangotti@hunter.cuny.edu
- Carlos Balsas
Carlos.Balsas@asu.edu
- Jocelyne Chait
joschait@yahoo.com
- Lee Deuben
LDeuben@cmap.illinois.gov
- Stacy Harwood
sharwood@uiuc.edu
- Marie Kennedy
mariekenned@gmail.com
- Josh Lerner
josh_lerner@hotmail.com
- Richard Milgrom
richardmilgrom@gmail.com
- Marla Nelson
mnelson@uno.edu
- Libby Porter
(www.pnuk.org.uk)
e.j.porter@sheffield.ac.uk
- Norma Rantisi
nrantisi@alcor.concordia.ca
- Alex Schafran
jaba1000@yahoo.com
- Amy Siciliano
asicilian@graffiti.net
- Meredith Phillips (YPN representative)
meredith.urbanplanning@gmail.com
- Cornell Carney (YPN representative)
editor.cornell@gmail.com

2) Getting Involved in a PN Committee!

The PN steering committee is currently forming several committees relating to membership, chapters, conferences and publications. Look out for an announcement in the next issue of the Magazine and the PN E-newsletter on how you can get involved.

- Conference Committee
contact: jaba1000@yahoo.com
- Magazine & Publications Committee
contact: editor@plannersnetwork.org
- Chapters Committee
contact: chapters@plannersnetwork.org
- Membership Committee
contact: LDeuben@cmap.illinois.gov
- Funding Committee
contact: nrantisi@alcor.concordia.ca
- Young Planners Network
(http://www.plannersnetwork.org/chapters_events/youth.html)
contact: ypn@plannersnetwork.org

3) PN Office Move

The PN office has moved this summer - from Minneapolis to Ithaca, NY. Please note our new contact info:

Planners Network
106 West Sibley Hall
Cornell University
Ithaca, NY 14853, USA
Phone: (607)254-8890

Mandana Nouri-Nekoei, who recently completed the B.A. Honours in Urban Planning at Concordia University (Montreal, Canada), is the new co-editor of the PN E-newsletter. She is joining Jason Blackman and is replacing Guillaume Neault. The Editorial Board would like to welcome Mandana, and to thank Guillaume for all his great work over the last two years.

PN Individual Member Directory!

Did you know that you could access a directory with all individual PN members? All you have to do is visit <http://www.plannersnetwork.org/join/directory.html>. The directory is password protected, so you will need the password that can be found on Progressive Planning Magazine mailing label.

YOUNG PLANNERS NETWORK NEWS

Since attending at the 2007 Planners Network Conference in New Orleans, the Young Planners Network (YPN) has continued to build a system of local and national support for young planners and their adult allies, and integrate young people into the field of planning. There are currently four chapters of the YPN – New York, New Orleans, Chicago, and the Bay Area – and our monthly conference calls have proven to be quite productive!

Thus far, our efforts have been focused on creating local YPN chapters, composing our statement of purpose, nominating and electing steering committee representatives (go Meredith and Cornell!), and planning our 2008 YPN Conference in New York City. We look forward to continued participation in the Planners Network, and will continue submitting updates from local chapters and the national network each month.

If you would like to contact the Young Planners Network, or get on our listserv, please email us at yfn@plannersnetwork.org. You can also check us out on the PN website, at http://www.plannersnetwork.org/chapters_events/youth.html Thanks!

CHAPTER UPDATES

The **New York chapter** has started a monthly book club, hosted by Bluestockings Book Store, a radical bookstore, fair trade cafe, and activist center in Lower East Side of Manhattan. We kicked off the club on July 29th with a great discussion of David Harvey's "The Spaces of Global Capitalism". In August, we will meet to discuss "There Goes the 'Hood: Views of Gentrification from the Ground Up" by Lance Freeman. For more information, email pnnycbookclub@gmail.com.

Planners Network - Chapter Update from **Toronto:** On the evening of October 11, 2007, Planners Network Toronto hosted a Disorientation and Social at Bedford Academy Restaurant & Pub in downtown Toronto. This chapter event was the first one for 2007, and provided an opportunity for current PN members and interested newcomers to learn more about Planners Network, its history and the activities of local chapters. The goal was to encourage and organize a revival of the Toronto chapter, and to brainstorm or create new initiatives and activities that could be done in the next twelve months. These initiatives involve reaching out and networking with people in diverse fields and professions, and preparing for the upcoming 2008 PN Conference in Winnipeg.

Among the twenty-two people in attendance was Barbara Rahder - Professor in the Faculty of Environmental Studies at York University and one of the pioneers of PN in Canada. She gave a brief presentation on the history of PN from the late 1970s to the present and its connection to progressive planning in Canada. Chloe Richer, Julian Rodriguez, and Barbara also talked about some of their experiences at the PN Conference in New Orleans.

Several PN Readers and some back issues of Progressive Planning Magazine were sold at the event, and helped to defray some of the cost of providing food for the evening. All in all, it was a successful event.

The Toronto chapter is looking forward to having an active 2007-2008 (in contrast to recent years). Special thanks to Julian, Chloe, Victoria Kramkowski-Epner, Sandra Kerr, and Amy Siciliano for taking the time to co-ordinate this great chapter event. We hope that PN Toronto will do this again in the near future.

PN MEMBER UPDATES

From **Tom Angotti:**

I am one of three members of the technical committee responsible for the UNITY 2007 Plan, a community-generated plan prepared as an alternative to Forest City, Ratner's megaproject for Brooklyn. Folks can find the story ⇨

of the opposition to this project told in the powerful documentary *Brooklyn Matters* (www.brooklynmatters.com). This summer I was one of two directors of a weeklong workshop on community planning at the Venezuelan Planning School in Caracas. Workshop members were community organizers in Caracas barrios. PNER Peter Marcuse and I also made presentations at a one-day conference there on Capitalist and Socialist Cities. Also this summer, along with PNER Ken Reardon I took part in a week-long workshop in Catania (Sicily), dealing with the Librino neighborhood, a Kenzo Tange megaproject. The workshop engaged PhD students from the Univ. of Catania and planners in work with a community-based organization to develop a strategy for the neighborhood.

From PNER **Prakash M. Apte**:

I have been appointed as a Short Term Consultant to the staff of the World Bank Group in India till June 2008. Visit my Home Page at <http://www.angelfire.com/indie/pmapte>.

From PN member **Clara Irazábal**:

In the remainder months of 2007, Clara Irazábal will be publishing five articles that include comparative and transnational perspectives: "Kitsch is Dead, Long Live Kitsch: The Production of *Hyperkitsch* in Las Vegas" (*Journal of Architectural and Planning Research*); "Neighborhoods in the Lead: Grassroots Planning for Social Transformation in Post-Katrina New Orleans?" (*Planning Practice & Research*, with Jason Neville); "Urban Design as a Catalyst for Social Change: A Comparative Look at Modernism and New Urbanism" (*Traditional Dwellings and Settlements Review*, with Michael Vanderbeek); "Entertainment-Retail Centers in Hong Kong and Los Angeles: Trends and Lessons" (*International Planning Studies*, with Surajit Chakravarty); and "Bounded Tourism: Immigrant Politics, Consumption, and Traditions in Plaza Mexico" (*Journal of Tourism and Cultural Change*, with Macarena Gómez-Barris).

From PN member **Dick Platkin**:

As a long-time member of PN, former member of the PN Steering Committee, and very recent

retiree, I would like to assemble an issue of Progressive Planning on Los Angeles and Southern California. Some of the themes I would like articles to address is the governance style of city government; the perennial role of real estate interests; the declining role of planning in land use decisions; the creation of top-down neighborhood councils; the growing gap between land use planning, social services, and public health; and the nearly inexplicable but successful public and private efforts to flush the largest domestic civil disturbance (1992 "riots") since the Civil War down the memory tube. Ideas can be sent dickplatkin@yahoo.com. Other themes for this proposed issue are, of course, welcome.

From PNER **Jeremy Thompson**:

Jeremy Thompson moved from Chicago to Boston in July to take a research position with the Boston Redevelopment Authority. He is interested in getting a PN chapter started in Massachusetts; if any other PN members in the area share this interest they should contact him at thompson.jeremyb@gmail.com.

From PN members **Jake Wagner, Daniel Samuels** and **Dana Eness**:

The Lafitte Greenway project is a citizen-led initiative with support from local non-profits (the Urban Conservancy, Steps to a Healthier LA, and FOLC), neighborhood associations (Mid-City, Faubourg St John), university planning programs (University of Missouri-Kansas City and the University of New Orleans), area businesses (D'Gerolamo Development), and local government agencies— including the Regional Planning Commission, City of New Orleans Department of Public Works, City Planning and the Office of Recovery Management.

Faculty and students from the Urban Planning and Design program at the University of Missouri-Kansas City began planning and design work on the Lafitte Corridor in January 2006. Their research involved collaboration with the Urban Conservancy, the Rails-to-Trails Conservancy as well as local residents from the Mid-City and Faubourg St. John neighborhoods.

Planners Network members **Jacob Wagner** and **Michael Frisch** have provided technical support and worked closely with city staff to implement this important recovery project as part of a grant funded by the Office of University Partnerships at the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development.

The **Rails-to-Trails Conservancy** – a national advocacy organization, has provided expertise and resources to assist and advise FOLC. Bikes Belong – a national bicycle advocacy group provided partial funding for a greenway master plan by FOLC and Brown + Danos landdesign– a Baton Rouge landscape design firm. Together with these partners, the citizen-advocates known as FOLC have kept the greenway project moving forward.

In addition to the economic and environmental benefits, the symbolic value of the Lafitte Greenway project for the city's recovery should not be underestimated. The vision for the Lafitte Greenway is one of optimism about New Orleans's future and the rebuilding of the city and its neighborhoods. There's much left to be done. To learn more about the Lafitte Corridor project and how you can help, please go to: Friends of Lafitte Corridor (FOLC) www.folc-nola.org , Steps to a Healthier Louisiana <http://www.stepsla.org/home2/section/6/bike-ped> .

Jake Wagner, University of Missouri-Kansas City,
816-235-6053, wagnerjaco@umkc.edu

Daniel Samuels, Friends of Lafitte Corridor,
504-482-0925, or info@folc-nola.org
Dana Eness, the Urban Conservancy,
504-232-7821 or dana@staylocal.org

EVENTS

March 5-7, 2008. "National Housing & HIV/AIDS Research Summit III" convened by the National AIDS Housing Coalition will be held in Baltimore, MD. For more Information, call (202)347-0333 or visit: www.nationalaidshousing.org/HousingandHIV-AIDSResearchSummit.htm

March 5-7, 2008. "Regional Equity Summit: Third National Summit on Equitable Development, Social Justice and Smart Growth. New Orleans, LA. www.regionalequity08.org

June 1-5, 2008. 46th International Making Cities Livable Conference on "True Urbanism: Designing the Healthy City" & Exhibit on "New Designs for Mixed-Use Urban Fabric" will be held in Santa Fe, NM. For more information, see www.LivableCities.org

PUBLICATIONS

"Chicago Communities and Prisoner Reentry," by Jill Farrell and Christy Visser is available from The Urban Institute, 2100 M St. NW, Wash., DC 20037, (202)261-5709, www.urban.org .

"Inequality in Children's School Readiness and Public Funding," by Katherine Magnuson, Marcia Meyers, Christopher J. Ruhm and Jane Waldvogel is available at www.irp.wisc.edu/publications/focus/pdfs/foc241c.pdf .

"The Kaiser Family Foundation website" has a segment on "Race, Ethnicity & Health Care" - <http://kaiseredu.org/>

"The Promises and Challenges of Co-ops" appeared in Shelterforce, www.nhi.org/online/issues/142/co-ops.html

"School Resegregation: Must the South Turn Back?," eds. John Charles Boger and Gary Orfield has been published by University of North Carolina Press.

"Urban Economics and Land Use in America: The Transformation of Cities in the Twentieth Century" (2004, 272pp.) published by M.E. Sharpe (www.mesharpe.com). Authored by PNER Alan Rabinowitz.

"Fair Play for Housing Rights" (2007) focuses on problems with mega-events such as Olympic Games. Available from CORE (Centre on Housing Rights and Evictions). For more information, contact fionn@cohre.org .

"We Can Make Change: Community Organizers Talk About What They Do – And Why" (2007) by Kristin Layng Szakos & Joe Szako. Published by Vanderbilt University Press. For more information, visit www.vanderbiltuniversitypress.com , call (615)343-2445 or e-mail sue.havlish@vanderbilt.edu

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
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